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The people of the United States have traditionally organized into politi-
cal, social, professional, religious, and other groups to find community,
to do business, to practice religion, and to effectuate change.' Many of
these groups have long-standing practices which limit membership on
the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or age.2
In recent years such discrimination has been attacked in many
forums. Disputes have arisen over groups ranging from the Boy Scouts3
to Princeton University's eating clubs4 and Harvard University's final
clubs;5 from the Jaycees6 and Rotary Clubs7 to the Bohemian,8 Cos-
mos, 9 and Century Clubs. 10 Meanwhile, entities ranging from the
federal government 1' to the Professional Golf Association (PGA)12 have
struggled with the question of whether or not they should interact with
clubs that discriminate.
Groucho Marx once wrote, "I don't want to belong to any club
that will accept me as a member." 13 By the same token, others often
1. ALzxIs DE TOcQumLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (1945).
2. For example, The Rotary Club International, United States Jaycees, numerous
country dubs, etc. See, e.g., Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F.
Supp. 1476 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Lynette Holloway, Single Women Join the Fight to
Breach Barriers at Exclusive Country Clubs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at A12.
3. See, e.g., Mankes v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 137 ER.D. 409 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
4. See Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), revd in
other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
5. Fighting All-Male Clubs at Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1987, at A43; Philip P
Pan, Harvard Club May End Ban on Women, BosToN GLOBE, Oct. 6, 1993, at 26.
6. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
7. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
[hereinafter Rotary].
8. Men's Club Is Subject of Calqbrnia Inquiry, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 4, 1988, at A31 (State
of California investigating discrimination at the Bohemian Club).
9. Philip M. Boffey, Women Lose a Round in Club Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1985,
at A22 (Cosmos Club votes against admitting women).
io. Michael Wines, Ruling Is Greeted with Praise from Women and Silence from Clubs,
N.Y. TimEs, June 21, 1988 at A19.
Ii. On one occasion, the Budget Director, James C. Miller III canceled a speaking
engagement at the Cosmos Club, an all-male club in Washington, D.C. Budget
Chief Cancels Speech at Men's Club, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1987, at A19.
12. The PGA scheduled a major event at the Shoal Creek Country Club, an organi-
zation that discriminated against African Americans. New Policy fr PGA Sites, N.Y.
TimEs, July 15, 1990, § VIII, at 6. After much controversy, the dub admitted
African Americans to membership. Civil rights leaders then agreed to call off
demonstrations at the dub. Jaime Diaz, Shoal Creek Club Agrees To Begin Admitting
B~acks, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 1, 1990, at A13.
13. Groucho Marx, in a letter of resignation to the Friars Club of Beverly Hills. Tmn
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question why a person would want to join a club that does not want
her to be a member. The answer is that many organizations have im-
portant benefits to offer.
The Boy Scouts, for instance, attracts many people by teaching
self-sufficiency and providing activities such as camping and exploring. 14
One family, however, was barred from membership because it did not
believe in God. 15 Others who wanted to become scout masters were
prevented from doing so because they were women 16 or homosexuals.'
7
Quasi-private clubs are an important category of organizations that
offer valuable benefits to their members, such as business, social, career,
or recreational opportunities. These benefits have prompted individuals,
legislatures, and courts to challenge discrimination in quasi-private
clubs. 18 This trend has, in turn, caused authoritative entities to become
increasingly wary of their involvement with discriminatory quasi-private
clubs. In recent years, the Senate Judiciary Committee has announced
that it will no longer confirm judicial nominees who have belonged to
a discriminatory club but did not work to change that club's practice of
discrimination. 19 The American Bar Association has suggested that it is
a violation of judicial ethics for judges to belong to discriminatory
OxFoRD DIcTIoNARY Op QuoTAnONs 451 (4th ed. 1992) (citing GROUCHO MARX,
GROUCHO AND ME (1959)).
14. See Old Line Youth Groups Back in Style, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 31, 1983,
at 75.
15. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. 111. 1992), a d, 993F.2d
1267 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 6021 (1993).
16. Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights
and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987).
17. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of The Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
18. Of course, those who belong to discriminating dubs defend their practices against
such arguments. Aside from arguing that they have a constitutional right to discrim-
inate as will be described later, they argue that the discrimination is necessary to
maintain the camaraderie that they seek. They believe that ending the discrimina-
tion will change the nature of the dub and ruin what they enjoy in the organiza-
tion. Other less substantial arguments, especially regarding sex discrimination,
indude that members would have to dress (in the Bohemian Club) or dress up (in
college social organizations) and would have to watch their language if women were
members. See also Daniel L. Schwartz, Note, Discrimination on Campus: A Critical
Examination of Single-Sex College Social Organizations, 75 CA.L L. Rzv. 2117,
2122-23 (1987).
19. Dana Priest, Judiciary Panel Warns About Clubs: Membership in Discriminatory
Organizations Called 7nappropriate, WASH. PosT, Aug. 3, 1990, at A26.
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clubs.20 The federal government barred government officials from
participating in their official capacities in meetings or conferences at
facilities which discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or
religion.21 After the PGA scheduled a major tournament at a discrimi-
natory country club, it announced that it would no longer hold any
tournaments at clubs that discriminate.22
Individuals are being challenged to take personal stands as well.
Tom Watson, a well-known professional golfer, resigned from his
prestigious golf club after it denied membership to Herbert Bloch
because he is Jewish.23 ' Former Vice President Dan Quayle agreed not
to play golf at one country club because it had no African-American
members. 24 The former Vice President, however, refused to take a
similar stand against the Burning Tree Club in Maryland, which bars
women from membership.25
This article focuses on discrimination in quasi-private clubs and
the impact of laws and the United States Constitution on that discrimi-
nation. For the purposes of this article, a quasi-private club is any
organization that claims to be private but which might in fact be
viewed as public. 26 The term "quasi-private" is used because litigation
concerning discriminfation in such organizations often rests on whether
the entity is private,27 and therefore cannot be regulated.
Section. I of this article explores why people join organizations, and
why they may want those organizations to discriminate. 28 It then exam-
ines why others seek to challenge this discrimination. 29
Section II addresses judicial and statutory efforts to reconcile the
various competing interests in challenges to quasi-private club discrimi-
nation. First, it explores whether there is a constitutional right to free-
20. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2 cmt. (1989).
21. Federal Personnel Manua4 (Inst. 246), Dec. 30, 1977.
22. Jaime Diaz, PGA Tour to Require Proof of Nonbias at'Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1990, at A43. This decision was made after the PGA was widely criticized for
holding its tournaments at dubs which discriminated.
23. Watson Quits Club, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at A30.
24. Quayle to Keep Gofing at Men-Only Club, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at A9.
25. Quayle to Keep Golfing at Men-Only Club, supra note 24.
26. The ways in which the terms "public" and "private" can be defined is one of the
primary topics of the rest of this article.
27. Rarely, if ever, do the organization's daims to be a dub fall into question.'
28. See infia part I.
29. See infa part I.B.
[Vol. 2:27
1994] THE KEY TO UNLOCKING THE CLUBHOUSE DOOR 31
dom of association and/or a bar to discrimination when the discriminat-
ing party is not a state actor.30 Second, it looks at the impact and judi-
cial interpretations of state statutes.31 As challenges and lawsuits involv-
ing discrimination in quasi-private clubs continue, different state and
federal laws barring discrimination in public accommodations-and
private club exemptions contained in those laws-have come under
increased scrutiny. The phrasing and interpretation of such statutes
greatly affects legal challenges to discrimination in quasi-private clubs.
Third, it addresses various constitutional limits to states' authority to
regulate discrimination in quasi-private clubs. 32 Section II also focuses
on the right to freedom of association in the contexts of expressive and
intimate association and freedom of religion.
Section III discusses how to reconcile the different rights through
statutes and court opinions.33 It argues that courts should narrowly
construe these rights in the context of quasi-private clubs to limit the
invidious effects of discrimination, but should also not simply ignore
the right of freedom of association.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSOCIATION AND
THE HARM OF DISCRIMINATION
A. Why People Join Organizations
Humans have a fundamental need for a feeling of community.34 Or-
ganizations fill this need by giving people a place where they can feel
important, needed, and accepted.
It was once common to call the United States a melting pot, as
many Americans subscribed to the belief that people from different
countries and cultures found a home in the United States and lived
together peacefully. Many of these people, however, have maintained
their cultural heritage or national identity. Thus, the melting pot has
become, in Jesse Jackson's formulation, a "Rainbow Coalition," 35 or, in
the words of former New York City Mayor David Dinkins, "a beautiful
30. See infra part I1.A.
31. See infra part II.B.
32. See infra part II.C.
33. See infra part III.
34. ELLoT McGrN'iEs, SocIAL PsYcHoLOGY: A FtcGrIoNAL AN;ALYsis 8 (1970).
35. Jesse Jackson, What Is Patriotism, 253 THE NATION 100, 102 (July 15, 1991).
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mosaic." 36 The metaphors are important because they recognize the
value of individual people's differences.
At the same time that we have begun to recognize the diverse
nature of our culture, people have also been moving away from their
extended families and into more ethnically mixed neighborhoods. 3 7
People move far more frequently in this generation than they did in
previous generations. As people move to new places, they want to
reestablish a sense of community by associating with people who share
common interests and backgrounds. This feeds people's desire to join
exclusionary clubs.38
The preference for exclusionary clubs has also increased as housing
patterns have changed. At one time, people lived in relatively homoge-
neous communities.39 This pattern was reinforced by housing discrimi-
nation which prevents selling or renting to certain groups of people. 40
After the Fair Housing Act of 1968,41 the geographic division between
different ethnic and religious groups began to break down.42 Thus,
people may now find that they live in neighborhoods populated with
people very different from themselves.
As a result, people may turn to organizations such as exclusionary
clubs to find individuals with whom they have more in common, such
as religion, ethnic heritage, or gender. Outside such associations, people
often feel highly vulnerable because of their different backgrounds.
Within the group, people are more able to discuss problems or issues
common to the group with less fear of being misunderstood or rejected,
as they might be by the wider community.
36. Ray Suarez, The Disquieting News from Home-Bensonhurst, CHi. TRIB., June 1,
1990, § 1, at 19.
37. Barbara Vobejda, Census Offers Close Look at National Trends, WASH. PosT, July 31,
1992, at Al.
38. People who have been longstanding members of communities also join discrimi-
natory dubs. Some join because their families have been members for generations.
When the dubs were founded and started their discriminatory practices, they often
barred members of religious or ethnic minority groups because of bigotry. Newer
members continue the practice, justifying it on the basis of tradition. (These state-
ments were made to the author in conversations with members of various discrimi-
natory dubs.)
39. See Vobejda, supra note 37.
40. See generally Joseph B. Rich, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, As Amendea4 by
the Department ofjustice, 46 Bus. LAw. 1335 (May 1991).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968).
42. See, e.g., D'Vera Cohn & Richard Morin, The Dispersion Decade Census Analysis
Shows Area Minorities Have Spread Out, WASH. PoSr, July 21, 1991, at Al.
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The self-segregating habits of some students dramatically illustrate
this pattern. African-American students are often criticized for sticking
together on campuses and forming organizations which bar white
students from membership. People notice that there is often an "Afri-
can-American table" in dining rooms and that African-American stu-
dents often want to live together, eat together, and socialize together. 43
While some argue that this is a form of segregation that runs counter to
the integration efforts of the 196os, and may feel threatened, the pattern
may be due to the fact that African-American students on primarily
white campuses often feel very isolated. 44 Associating with other Afri-
can-American students can decrease their anxiety about facing racist
remarks and attitudes, due to a certain level of assumed understanding
of their struggles and culture. In the overwhelmingly white environment
of higher education, these students seek a sense of community and
sharing. What others perceive as self-segregation is primarily an expres-
sion of the need to belong.45
This pattern is also seen in single-sex groups. There is often sexual
tension between heterosexual men and women, and people may feel
they cannot be themselves in front of the opposite sex.46 The easiest
way to find a retreat from this tension is to have a time and place
where people of the opposite sex are not present.47
Some men and women also feel a special camaraderie when they
are with members of their own sex.48 Sports teams promote this kind of
43. Brooke A. Masters, U. Va. Students Share Black, White Experiences, WASH. POST,
Apr. 21, 1991, at A8.
44. Masters, supra note 43.
45. There are negative aspects to this self-segregation. White students who would be al-
lies in the struggles of the African-American students are sometimes afraid to
approach them and lend support because they fear that they will be rejected.
Sometimes, the African-American students lose some of the benefits of being on the
campus if they segregate themselves too much from the other students. All students
learn from interaction with those who are different. Those who close themselves off
from others lose some of the most important lessons colleges have to offer their
students.
46. For example, people may worry about their appearance when faced with the oppo-
site sex.
47. John Clare, Are Single Sex Colleges Worth Preserving?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 1,
1993, at 16.
48. See Steven M. Colloton, Freedom of Association: The Attack on Single-Sex College
Social Organizations, 4 YALE L. & Po.'y Rnv. 426, 442 (1986).
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bond,49 but other associations can have the same effect. This camara-
derie can come from the feeling of community or the commonality of
shared ethnic, religious, racial, or cultural backgrounds. In the same way
that members of cultural and ethnic groups need to share parts of their
lives with people of the same or similar background, men and women
need to share aspects of their lives with people of the same sex, 50 who
may be better able to understand their needs.
For high school or college students, the sexual tensions may be
especially difficult because people at that age are becoming independent
and still learning about their sexuality. Thus, a need to retreat from an
environment fostering great sexual tension into a single-sex environment
may be even more important. 51
In the business world, there is immense stress and competition.
Many people, whether married or single, may feel a need to escape
from the competition and tension of the work world. For some, a
single-sex environment is the only place where this can be done. 52
All of these factors contribute to people's desire to associate with
similar individuals, often to the exclusion of those who are different.
These genuine feelings must be recognized and respected as the basis
for acknowledging a right to some form of freedom of association. At
the same time, other issues-the major problems caused by discrimina-
tion and society's interest in remedying these problems-are involved
when exploring discrimination at quasi-private clubs.
B. Problems Caused by Discrimination in
Quasi-Private Clubs
There is a long history of virulent discrimination in the United States.
This discrimination causes society to lose the potential contributions of
many of its members. When certain groups of people are barred from
contributing all they can to society's improvement, everyone suffers. 53 If
people have no hope of achievement, they have no reason to participate
49. Vincent Bozzi, You Are What You Play: Sports Stereoypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Oct.
1989, at 69.
50. Clare, supra note 47, at 16.
51. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 2123.
52. Clare, supra note 47, at 16.
53. See, e.g., U.S. NATIONAL ADVISOR COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPoRT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CVIL DISORDERS 295-96 (1968)
[hereinafter Kerner Commission Report] (attributing part of the cause of the Watts
Riot of 1965 to rampant discrimination).
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in society and may then become outsiders, a phenomenon visible in
our urban ghettos. 54
Many antidiscrimination laws were passed because people in the
United States became convinced that simple justice required barring
discrimination. Today, the federal government and most states bar some
forms of discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommo-
dations. Federal and state laws vary in which forms and in which
environments discrimination is deemed unlawful. The purpose of all of
the statutes, however, is to stop discrimination and its harmful effects.
The specific injuries caused by discrimination vary at different
stages of an individual's life. The need to be included and accepted is
especially important for young people. Children internalize others'
negative stereotypes of them. In noted experiments to determine the
effects of school segregation on children, psychologist Kenneth Clark
asked African-American children in segregated schools to describe
characteristics of both black and white dolls.55 The children used posi-
tive adjectives to describe the white dolls, and used negative adjectives
to describe the black dolls. From this he concluded that African-Ameri-
can children subjected to segregation form negative self images. 56 The
Supreme Court cited this study when it outlawed segregation in public
schools, finding that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."57
Discrimination against children due to race, sex, religion, or other
categories also impinges upon opportunities to learn and grow. One
54. Many youths are responding to this sense of hopelessness by joining gangs so that
they can enjoy life now by earning large sums of money even if they risk a violent
young death.
55. K.B. CLARK, THE EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DIscRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY
DEVrOrPMENT (1950).
56. One author summarizes Clark's study as follows:
Forty years ago, the study found, black girls wanted white dolls; but by
the mid-1970s, at the height of the black-pride movement, the choice had
turned to black dolls.
By the mid-1980s, the situation had reversed itself, with black girls
preferring white dolls at rates surpassing the level of the 1950s.
Courtland Milloy, The Queen Is White, The Pawns Are Black, WAsH. PoST, May 16,
1991, at C3 (summarizing K.B. CLAwx, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRiMATION
ON PERSoNAI DEvELOPmENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Children
and Youth, 1950)).
57. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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young girl who brought a lawsuit to obtain permission to attend a Boy
Scout summer camp explained that she wanted to participate in activi-
ties offered by the Boy Scouts, which differed substantially from those
offered by the Girl Scouts. 58
Similarly, for a number of years, girls were barred from participat-
ing in many athletic programs available to boys, such as Little League
Baseball. While other sports, such as softball, were available to girls,
those sports did not offer the same opportunities for development.
Since 1974, when a New Jersey appellate court declared Little League
Baseball's exclusion bf girls to be illegal, 59 many girls have participated
in organized baseball and grown from their ability to do so, gaining a
sense of equality and self-esteem.
Discrimination at any age also reinforces negative stereotypes about
people. For instance, in the above example, barring girls from Little
League Baseball reinforced the view of girls as unathletic and too fragile
to be involved in sports with boys. Similarly, by maintaining different
programs Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts could foster stereotypes about the
interests of boys and girls, thereby limiting the range of activities avail-
able to them. American children are also victimized by the bar against
homosexuals in the Boy Scouts because it reinforces the false notion
that it is unsafe to have homosexuals around young boys.60 The ban
also deprives children of willing scout masters, and prohibits young
people who realize they are homosexual from joining the group.6 1
As people grow older, stereotypes are reinforced in different ways.
Discrimination in student organizations is often a problem because it
fosters an acceptance of discrimination. If the most prestigious organiza-
tions on a college campus discriminate, students may learn that discrim-
ination is acceptable or even desirable, because inherent in the message
58. Mankes v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 137 ER.D. 409 (S.D. Fla. 1991). Many Girl
Scout troops have traditionally focused on domestic skills like cooking and sewing
while the Boy Scouts have traditionally focused on activities like exploring, camping
and trade-based skills. See, e.g., A Rock of Gibraltar: Scouts on Solid Ground, Aiuz.
REPUB., June 28, 1991, at A10.
59. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974), affa 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974).
60. The myths that are perpetuated accuse homosexuals of seeking to recruit others to
be homosexuals, or of molesting children. These accusations are false, but they are
perpetuated and given credence when a respected group like the Boy Scouts bars
homosexuals. See Old-Line Youth Groups Back in Style, supra note 14, at 75.
61. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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of discrimination is the message that the excluded person is not good
enough to be part of the group. If the person is not good enough for
the group, it also may be appropriate to exclude the person from parts
of the social and business world. Thus, the message sent by discrimina-
tion on college campuses-especially discrimination by elite organiza-
tions-is a dangerous one.
Sex discrimination in organizations like fraternities can cause other
problems as well. When the single-sex atmosphere is combined with
alcohol and youth, dangerous incidents can occur. Stories of sexual
harassment, gang rape, and date rape abound at fraternities. 62 If both
men and women were part of such organizations, the tenor of discus-
sion might change to a point where sexual incidents would be far less
likely.
There are more fundamental reasons, however, for concern about
discrimination in institutions affiliated with universities. Because univer-
sities shape students' outlooks in addition to educating them, discrimi-
nation at universities can have lasting negative effects. 63 If students do
not learn how to interact comfortably with a diverse group of people
while at school, they may be unable to do so in the workplace, which is
especially harmful if they are in a position to hire others. Final job
determinations are often based on relatively subjective criteria. Employ-
ers often hire those with whom they feel most comfortable as equals.6 4
Consequently, when students are allowed to discriminate in their col-
lege social organizations because they feel uncomfortable relating to
62. Judy Mann, Warning for College-Bound, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 4, 1991, at D3. Inci-
dents involving the taunting of minorities under similar circumstances have also
taken place. See Patricia 'Williams, The Obliging Shelk An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MicH. L. Ray. 2128, 2133-37 (1989).
63. One New Jersey Court explained:
Princeton as a public accommodation for higher education performs a
significant social function by promoting "the pursuit of truth, the discov-
ery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the teaching and
general development of students, and the transmission of knowledge and
learning to society at large." ... Hence it is important to eradicate sex
discrimination at Princeton and private establishments associated with
Princeton which have altered their distinctly private character through
close association with the University.
Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142, 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
64. See Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Opinions in Professional
Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 How. L.J. 723 (1983).
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those whom they feel are different, they are likely to continue this
pattern when they graduate and hire others.
For people in the business world, discrimination can cause other
problems. It is often the most prestigious clubs that discriminate.65
These clubs can be crucial to developing business connections. Govern-
ment policy is also often shaped behind the closed doors of such clubs.
When people are barred from these organizations, they are also barred
from cultivating business opportunities, 66 and from influencing policy
through informal contact with policymakers. Being in the "right" club
can be crucial to one's career.
Whether a person lives in a small city, a large city, or a suburb,
the key to power within a community is often the same: membership in
the community's elite organizations. Thus, denial of access to such
organizations because of discrimination due to race, color, religion,
national origin, sex,. sexual orientation, or other criteria not based on
individual merit deprives people of their ability to participate fully in
society.
People need to find groups of similarly minded or similarly situat-
ed individuals with whom to form ties. At the same time, problems
arise when such organizations discriminate against other groups. The
question then becomes whether there is any way to reconcile the appar-
ent conflict between the need to associate selectively and the need to be
free from discrimination.
65. For instance the final dubs, "which alone in the Ivy League still bar women and
count about 5 percent of the 4,000 male undergraduates as members," have had
members including Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Anthony Lake (President Clinton's
National Security Adviser), Jay Rockefeller, and Evan Thomas (Washington Bureau
Chief for Newsweek). Sara Rimer, All-Male Club Opens Its Door Warily, N.Y.
TImEs, Oct. 9, 1993, at A9. See also Michael M. Burns, The Exclusion of Women
firom Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HAzv. C.Rt-C.LL Rzv. 321 (1983).
66. One trenchant observer noted the harm done by discriminatory dubs and wrote:
Few people appreciate the integral relationship between club membership
and professional achievement, although the correlation has been well
documented. These clubs provide an environment within which "friend-
ships and associations are formed which express themselves in business
opportunities, positive evaluations, and predispositions toward promo-
tion." In our society, membership in the "right" clubs may well be a
necessity for developing the right connections to attain positions of
leadership in the community.
Bums, supra note 65, at 327-28.
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Sometimes no conffict arises because the people who are excluded
will not challenge their exclusion. In other words, they do not want to
be where they are not wanted. If an organization does not provide any
major benefits other than companionship, it is unlikely an outsider
would insist on membership. When, however, there are other benefits
to membership, such as business opportunities, access to government
policymakers, participation in the "old boy's" network, or access to
facilities not otherwise available in the community, excluded individuals
may be more interested in joining. Some of those who are barred will
likely resort to political pressure or legal measures to force open the
doors to membership in these beneficial organizations. 67
The remainder of this article explores the legal issues that arise in
opposing discrimination in quasi-private clubs.
II. THE IMPACT OF LAW AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS
ON QUASI-PRIVATE CLUBS
A. The Constitution
On its face, the Constitution has little to say about discrimination in
quasi-private clubs. Nowhere in the Constitution are the words "free-
dom of association." Most scholars, however, believe that the concept is
implicit in the document and can be found with minimal interpreta-
tion.
The First Amendment guarantees the rights to assemble peaceably,
to petition the government for a redress of grievances, to speak with
freedom, and to exercise one's religion freely.68 These activities often
require association with other people. 69 If the right to associate freely
did not exist, the government could easily infringe upon other First
Amendment rights.
To find a right to associate freely when not for the purpose of
exercising First Amendment rights, it is necessary to look elsewhere in
the Constitution. The Supreme Court, as will be discussed more flly
below, has found freedom of association to lie within the penumbras of
67. See Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (NJ. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. For instance, ten adult Jews (or ten adult Jewish men, depending on the branch)
are required for certain kinds of communal prayer in Judaism.
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the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore
within the right to privacy.70
That we infer a right to association from the right to privacy
acknowledges that people come together to fulfill personal, social, and
community needs. In doing so, they are not trying to affect or change
government policy, but are merely trying to obtain a sense of commu-
nity by being with people who are like them. Such an association can
be deeply personal and intimate. When the group that has formed is
small, it can be like an extended family for its members.
Thus, finding a constitutional basis for a right to freedom of
association requires a definition of the type of association desired. The
basis for this can be found either by looking towards the First Amend-
ment or by looking towards the right to privacy. Either way, freedom
of association is embedded in constitutional principles.
Many would also argue that there is no constitutional right to be
free of discrimination perpetrated by non-governmental entities. While
the Constitution bars some forms of discrimination by the federal
government, 71 and the Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination
under certain circumstances by states or their sub-entities,72 the Consti-
tution does not govern conduct by private parties.73 To find a basis on
which to challenge discrimination in quasi-private clubs, therefore, one
must look to state or federal statutes.
B. State and Federal Laws That Address Discrimination
in Quasi-Private Clubs74
The federal government and the governments of many states have
adopted laws which bar certain types of discrimination in public accom-
modations. These laws are intended to permit people to use, without
70. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
73. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). (The Thirteenth Amendment is
an exception. Its bar on slavery directly affects the conduct of private parties. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII.)
74. I will not attempt to survey every state's public accommodations laws to determine
their scope and their definitions in this article. Instead of an exhaustive survey, I
will examine different statutes to show the variations that have been used in the
definitions and how they have been interpreted by courts. In each sample, I will
explore whether or not arguments could be made successfully that quasi-private
clubs may not discriminate under a particular law.
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discrimination, privately owned facilities which are open to the public.7 5
Following the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Supreme Court over-
turned federal legislation passed at the end of the Civil War aimed at
such entities,76 states began developing similar antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. The federal government passed a new law barring discrimination
in public accommodations as part of the Civil Rights Act of I964.7 7
The federal government, state, and city public accommodations
laws differ greatly in their treatment of which types of organizations
and what types of discrimination78 should be barred. Some states define
"public accommodations" in terms of the business aspects of an organi-
zation, 79 while others define it in terms of public use.80 In some states,
whether an organization is deemed a public accommodation depends on
whether it meets at one particular place.81 Finally, a few states have
laws that seem to include all organizations not protected by freedom of
association.82
In this section of the article, I will describe some of the definitions
of "public accommodations" used by states, cities, and the federal
government in their statutes and/or in court rulings, exploring the
benefits and drawbacks of each definition.
1. The Effect of Using "Place" as a Distinguishing Feature
in Public Accommodations Statutes
Most public accommodations laws bar discrimination in "places of
public accommodation." While some people view the word "place" as
75. This may indude stores, restaurants, hotels, swimming pools, and other businesses.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1.5 (West 1993).
76. Robinson v. Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1988).
78. For instance, only six states, the District of Columbia, and several cities bar dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. The federal government does not. Most
jurisdictions with public accommodations laws bar discrimination based on race,
color, religion, and national origin; several, including the federal government, do
not bar sex discrimination in public accommodations. There are other variations as
well.
79. See CAL CiV. CODE § 51 (West 1982); MmN. STAr. ANN. § 363.01 (West 1991).
80. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (1991).
81. See AiAsKA STAT. § 18.80.300(14) (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2502 (1981); IowA
CODE ANN. § 601A.2 (West 1990); MAss. ANN. Laws ch. 272 § 92A (Law. Co-op.
1992).
82. See NJ. SxT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 1993).
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merely an introductory phrase, many courts interpret "place" as a factor
limiting which entities are public accommodations. These courts have
ruled that in order to be considered a public accommodation, the entity
must exist at a particular place. This interpretation places obstacles in
the way of defining quasi-private clubs as public accommodations.
Many quasi-private clubs which have a history of discrimination, such
as the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, as well as the Boy Scouts, meet in
different places throughout the community. Thus, attacks on discrimi-
nation in such quasi-private clubs have met with varying results depend-
ing on states' interpretations of the importance of the word "place" in
their statutes.8 3
83. There have been several challenges to the discrimination against women that was
practiced by the Jaycees until 1984. At least three of those challenges were rejected
in part because the Jaycees "does not operate from any particular place." United
States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1011-12 (Alaska 1983); United States
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C. 1981); United States Jaycees v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. 1983).
The Alaska Supreme Court explained,
In our view, the Jaycees, which does not operate from a fixed geographic-
al situs, should not be considered a "place" for purposes of the definition
of "Public Accommodation" under A.S. 18.80.300(7). Thus, we hold that
the Jaycees' organization does not fall within the prohibition of A.S.
18.80.230 which applies exclusively to places of public accommodation.
Richardet, 666 P.2d at 1012.
A federal district court has taken a similar approach to the question of the
definition of the word "place" in the federal public accommodations statute, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(a),(e). Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill,
1992), aftd, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 602 (1993).
The case before that court involved religious discrimination by the Boy Scouts. The
Boy Scouts would not admit as a member anyone who refused to subscribe to a
belief in God. The court found that "Tide II has never been applied so broadly as
to encompass organizations which lack a tie to a facility of the kinds enumerated in
the statute." Welsh, 787 F. Supp. at 1523.
The Iowa Supreme Court agreed with that literal interpretation of place when it
had to decide if the Jaycees violated Iowa's public accommodations law, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 60iA.2 (West 1988).
We are persuaded by the literal and ordinary definition of the statutory
term that the United States Jaycees is not a "place" within our definition
of "public accommodation." Similarly, we do not think the organization
is either an "establishment".... or a "facility" .... The ordinary usage
of these terms connotes a spatial dimension which the Jaycees' member-
ship, as such, does not possess.
United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa
1988) (citations omitted).
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Even if a Court views "place" as a meaningful term in the public
accommodations statute, this definition need not be quite so limiting as
it might seem at first. All entities exist at a place, even if this place
changes on occasion. In 1974, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, used this understanding of "place" to find that the Little
League was a place of public accommodation. 84
In many ways, this definition of "place" serves to recognize the
word and, at the same time, render it meaningless. If the court views
the purpose of the statute as being the eradication of discrimination
wherever possible, an expansive definition of "place" is appropriate. If,
however, the purpose of the statute is to eliminate discrimination in a
limited number of settings, "place" should be defined so as to limit the
This decision is especially noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Iowa Supreme
Court specifically rejected a broader reading of its statute by a federal court which
had conduded that the Jaycees could not discriminate based on sex in Iowa. United
States Jaycees v. Cedar Rapids Jaycees, 614 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Iowa 1985), affid
on other grounds, 794 F.2d 379 (8th Cit. 1986). Second, this decision was made
four years after the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was not unconstitu-
tional to order the Jaycees to admit women. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984). The Jaycees subsequently admitted women. United States Jaycees
v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Iowa 1988).
84. The court found that since Little League Baseball met at different places it met the
definition of place and was therefore a public accommodation. National Org. for
Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974), affd, 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974). A New Jersey federal district court judge
used similar reasoning to find that the Kiwanis Club was a place of public accom-
modation under New Jersey law. Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F.
Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1986), rev'd, 806 F.2d 468 (3rd Cit. 1986).
The New Jersey courts are not unique in their interpretation of place. The
Minnesota Supreme Court used similar reasoning to find that the Jaycees is a public
business "facility" within the meaning of its law, MwN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West
1991):
We need not decide whether "facilities" should be construed to include
persons. What we decide here is that an organization engaged in the
business of seeking to advance its members and to add to their ranks by
assiduously selling memberships in this state is a "public business facility."
In more familiar terms, such an organization has more than the "mini-
mum contacts" to qualify as doing business in this state, and its facilities
are anywhere it promotes, solicits, and engages in the sale of memberships
on an unselective basis.
United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Minn. 1981).
The New York Court of Appeals adopted New Jersey's and Minnesota's reason-
ing and ruled that the term "place," "is a term of convenience not limitation."
United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d
1199, 1203 (N.Y. 1983).
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application of the statute. It is this difference in philosophy which may
have led different courts to their varying definitions of "place."
Courts should be sure, however, to examine the rest of the statuto-
ry definition as written by the legislature to determine what is a place
of public accommodation rather than base their decision on the mere
use of the word "place." Courts should only use the word "place" to
limit statutes if the legislature clearly expressed such an intention in the
statute's definition.85
2. Is the Club Open to the General Public?
Many states define "public accommodations" in terms of the entity's
relationship to the general public. These states bar discrimination in
entities that serve the public. In some cases, they exempt private clubs
from their antidiscrimination laws, but include a clause stating that the
clubs may not discriminate in areas or at functions where nonmembers
are present.86
Like statutes that include the word "place," statutes that define
public accommodations in terms of their public use are subject to a
wide variety of interpretations. Some states categorize all businesses as
public accommodations, as would be the usual understanding of the
phrase "open to the.public."87 Others, however, have chosen to inter-
pret the statute more narrowly.8 8 These states give an extremely con-
85. At least one court found that the crucial difference between states in which "place"
was determinative and ones in which it was not was whether the word "place" was
repeated in the definition of the term "place of public accommodation." Welsh v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1530 (N.D. Ill. 1992), affid, 993 F.2d
1267 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 602 (1993).
86. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(10) (West 1988); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN.
§ 344.120 (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1993); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(303)
(Callaghan 1990); Op. Rnv. STAT. § 30.675 (1993); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 954(13) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1(12) (1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-21-102(15) (1991); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 9.91.010(1)(d) (West
1988); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(j) (1994).
87. See, e.g., CAL. CwV. CODE § 51 (West 1982); MINN. STaT. ANN. § 363.01(33)
(West 1991).
88. In South Dakota, for instance, the public accommodations law bars discrimination
at "any place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind .... that caters or offers
services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or gratuitously."
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-13-1(12) (Supp. 1994).
A South Dakota court found that Prudential Insurance Company was not
covered by that state's public accommodations law. It reasoned, "Prudential does
not solicit the patronage of the general public and is not a place of general trade; it
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stricted reading to the statute, which seems to interfere with the reme-
dial policy embodied in antidiscrimination laws. An example of an
unreasonable reading of "open to the public" has occurred in states that
interpret the phrase to exclude wholesale businesses because they do not
do business with the general public.89
only insures selected risks .... Such solicitation and selling through individual
agents dealing with selected groups and selected risks on matters of private contract
does not constitute a public accommodation." South Dakota Div. of Human Rights
ex rel Ewing v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 273 N.W.2d 111, 113 (S.D. 1978)
(footnote omitted).
Likewise, the Oregon statute is similar to many others in that it bars discrimina-
tion in "any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages,
facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements
or otherwise." It also has a typical private dub exemption. Op. Rnv. STAT. § 30.675
(1993).
Like the South Dakota statute, the Oregon statute has been interpreted very
narrowly by Oregon's courts. In one case, a court held that a wholesaler was not
barred from discriminating under the law because it dealt with retailers, not the
general public. Graham v. Kold Kist Beverage Ice, Inc., 607 P.2d 759 (Or. Ct.
App. 1979). In another case, an Oregon court found that a custom builder was not
covered by the law because he did not advertise his services to the general public.
Parsons v. Henry, 672 P.2d 717 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
With such interpretations, it is not surprising that the Oregon Supreme Court
found that the Boy Scouts of America was not covered by its antidiscrimination
law. Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976). That court held
that the Oregon statute was intended "to prohibit discrimination by business or
commercial enterprises which offer goods or services to the public." Schwenk, 551
P.2d at 468; See infra, part IIC, for interpretations of "business or commercial
enterprises." The court found legislative history suggesting that the Young Men's
Christian Association (YMCA) and Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)
would be exempt from Oregon's law. Schwenk, 551 P.2d at 468. Because the court
did not view the Boy Scouts as a commercial enterprise, but rather viewed the
organization as similar to the YMCA and YWCA, it held that the organization was
exempt from the law. Schwenk, 551 P.2d at 469.
Oregon may be changing its view somewhat, however. In a more recent case,
Lloyd Lions Club v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or. Ct.
App. 1986), an Oregon court ruled: "Wle conclude that defendant is a business
which sells memberships and substantial concomitant business advantages to the
male public throughout the state. Defendant is not a 'private' organization. It is
open to virtually all, except women." Lloyd Lions Club, 724 P.2d at 890-91 (foot-
note omitted). Thus, perhaps in Oregon, challenges to quasi-private clubs that have
no membership criteria other than excluding a protected class will now be reviewed
more favorably.
89. See Graham, 607 P.2d 759; South Dakota Div. of Human Rights ex reL Ewing v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 273 N.W.2d 111 (S.D. 1978). The courts' reasoning in
these situations is faulty, since they are ignoring members of the general public who
have retail businesses.
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The application of such public accommodations laws to quasi-
private clubs is especially complex. Typically, membership in a quasi-
private club is not available to the general public, and is therefore not
subject to statutory provisions barring discrimination. Only courts that
broadly interpret "open to the public" to include any club with few
membership criteria .would scrutinize discriminatory practices in mem-
bership selection.90
When, however, the statutes prohibit discrimination in private club
activities which are open to the public, they can have a profound effect
on discrimination in quasi-private clubs. Such a law barring private club
discrimination in a club's public functions9l was used in two Pennsylva-
nia cases involving the Loyal Order of Moose.92 In these cases, the
court found that certain activities of each lodge were open to the pub-
lic. In Commonwealth, Human Relations Commission v. Loyal Order of
90. A federal district court interpreted Iowa's statute, IowA CODE ANN. § 601A (West
1981), broadly and found that the Jaycees "provides services to the general public
and therefore, is a public accommodation." United States Jaycees v. Cedar Rapids
Jaycees, 614 F. Supp., 515, 517 (D.C. Iowa 1985), affidon other grounds, 794 F.2d
379 (8th Cir. 1986). The Iowa Supreme Court, however, found that Rotary
International (Good v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 368 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1985))
and the Jaycees (United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d
450 (Iowa 1988)) are not public accommodations. In Good, an exchange program
was advertised, and there were eligibility requirements. Because of those require-
ments, the court found that the program was not offered to the general public.
Good, 368 N.W.2d at 156.
91. The statute states:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice... in the case of a frater-
nal corporation or association, unless based upon membership in such
association or corporation... (h)(10)(i) For any person being the owner,
lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employe [sic] of any
public accommodation, resort or amusement to: (1) Refuse, withhold
from, or deny to any person because of his race, color, sex, religious
creed, ancestry, national origin or handicap or disability, or to any person
due to use of a guide or support animal because of the blindness, deafness
or physical handicap of the user... either directly or indirectly, any of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of such place of
public accommodation, resort, or amusement.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (1994).
92. Commonwealth, Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No.
107, 294 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972) [hereinafter
Lodge No. 1O7]; Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 145 v. Commonwealth, Human
Relations Comm'n, 328 A.2d 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) [hereinafter Lodge No.
1451.
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Moose, Lodge No. 107 [hereinafter Lodge No. lO7],93 African Americans
were refused service in the lodge's dining room, which was open to the
general white public.94 Similarly, in Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. i45
v. Commonwealth, Human Relations Commission [hereinafter Lodge No.
145], 9 5 a bowling league that was open to white people denied member-
ship to African Americans.96
The Pennsylvania courts in both cases ruled that the discrimination
was illegal. In Lodge No. 107, the court drew a careful distinction be-
tween discrimination in membership and discrimination in activities
open to the public. The antidiscrimination statute exempts membership
decisions of fraternal organizations. 97 Those organizations' activities
which are open to the public are not, however, exempt. 98 The court in
Lodge No. 145 reached the same conclusion. 99
Other clubs may find themselves subject to antidiscrimination laws
in some of their activities "when such distinctly private place, establish-
ment or facility caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the non-
members for fee or charge or gratuitously .... 100 The statutes do not
bar discrimination in club membership but may be used to challenge
discrimination in access to the clubs. For instance, many country clubs
have different golfing hours for men and women. 10 1 In such instances,
93. 294 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1972).
94. Id at 594.
95. 328 A.2d 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
96. Id. at 180.
97. PA. SxTA. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h)(10) (1994).
98. Lodge No. xo7, 294 A.2d at 597.
99. Lodge No. r45, 328 A.2d at 183. Notably, Lodge No. 107 was the same Moose
Lodge that was the subject of an important Supreme Court decision on state action
and discrimination. Moose Lodge No. ro7 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter
Moose Lodge]. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court found that although a dub had
a liquor license and a tax exemption, its discrimination did not constitute state
action. The discrimination, therefore, was not barred by federal statutory or consti-
tutional law. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175-76. The Supreme Court's decision did
not, however, go so far as to say that the dub had a constitutional right to discrimi-
nate. It merely found that the Lodge's discrimination was not barred by the Consti-
tution.
100. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(10) (West 1988); see also MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 37.2303 (West 1994).
101. Single women were barred from membership, and wives who were admitted to a
dub because their husbands were members were barred from the men's grill and
not allowed to golf on weekend mornings. Wives, the dub reasoned, had all week
to play. Lynette Holloway, Single Women Join the Fight to Breach Barriers at Expen-
sive Country Clubs, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 16, 1993, at A12.
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men are usually allowed to golf early in the morning while women are
relegated to less preferable times. Women are inconvenienced by the
inability to golf around a business schedule and by the inability to use
the activity as a setting in which to conduct business with clients or
associates. 10 2 If women can show that nonmembers are permitted to
golf during the men's golfing time, they could mount a legal attack
against such discrimination. Courts may rule that since the club had
opened its facilities to nonmembers, it was therefore barred from dis-
criminating in the facilities' availability.103
It is, therefore, clear that legal challenges to discrimination in the
membership policies of quasi-private clubs are unlikely to succeed in
states that define "public accommodation" in terms of "use by the
general public."10 4 To succeed, a challenger must show that most of the
organization's activities are open to the public and that there are few
membership restrictions beyond the discriminatory ones. Therefore,
challengers will have more success if they object to discriminatory
practices in which the quasi-private clubs engage when nonmembers are
present.
3. Statutes That Bar Discrimination in "Businesses"
Many states bar discrimination in businesses by defining a business as a
public accommodation. 10 5 As with "place," state court definitions of
"business" have varied to a large degree. Some states have been inclined
to interpret the term narrowly and to find that only profit-making
operations qualify as businesses. In those states, quasi-private clubs are
excluded from coverage under the state public accommodations law.106
102. Holloway, supra note 101, at B5. (The Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA)
this year organized dinics to teach women how to use golf as a business tool.
According to Cindy Davis, director of the LPGA Teaching and Professional Club
Division in Daytona Beach, Florida: "[w]omen are finding it's an excellent business
tool for them... It's a relationship-building sport.")
103. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2 (West 1988).
104. See National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), affd 338 A.2d 198 (NJ. 1974).
105. See, e.g., CAL. Crw. CODE § 51 (West 1982); CoLo. Rzv. SrTA. § 24-34-601 (Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West 1991).
106. Alaska, for example, found that a membership organization cannot be a public ac-
commodation under its law. United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008,
1012 (Alaska 1983). At least two other states have attacked the business aspect of
discriminatory dubs not by barring them from discriminating, but rather by pre-
venting people from using business expenses as tax deductions when the expenses
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Other states have defined "business" to encompass any organization
that has any business operations within the state. If, for instance, an
organization sells anything or pays anyone in the state, it is viewed as a
business.' 07 Courts have also included quasi-private clubs in their defi-
nition of "business" when they have found that the clubs exist primarily
for business purposes.'08
One reason for the difference in interpretations of the word "busi-
ness" may be in the wording of the statutes. For instance, California's
Civil Rights Act states that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color,
are incurred at a discriminatory dub. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.7(25) (West 1990).
See also MD. CODE ANN., TAx-PRoP. § 8-214 (1994).
107. The Boy Scouts was held to be a business under the California law for several rea-
sons. CAL Crv. CODE § 51 (WEsT 1982). Its business activities included franchising
retail outlets, having a copyright for the Boy Scouts uniform and emblem, book
publishing, and owning a retail store. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy
Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Because the Boy Scouts
organization has no limitation on membership (except for age, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, and religion), its claim that it is private and has the freedom of association
right to discriminate was rejected by the California Court. Curran, 195 Cal. Rptr.
at 337-38.
Similar reasoning was used to find that the Boys' Club was not exempt from
California's antidiscrimination law. Its business attributes included having a paid
staff. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 152 (Cal.
1985). The Court, however, also found that its "status as a 'business establishment'
covered by the act arises from its 'public' nature; it offers basic recreational faciities
to a broad segment of the population, excluding only a particular group expressly
recognized by the Act as a traditional target of discrimination." Isbister, 219 Cal.
Rptr. at 158 (foomote omitted). The nonselective nature of the Boys' Club, like
that of the Boy Scouts, caused the court to reject its freedom of association claims.
Isbister, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
1o8. California found the Rotary Club to be a business. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board
of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The
Court noted that Rotary was founded to give its members a commercial advantage.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Business reciprocity is also a reason
for joining Rotary. Rotary Club of Duarte, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Moreover, some
members view Rotary as of such use to them in their business that they deduct their
membership dues from their income taxes as business expenses, or they have their
employers pay their dues. Rotary Club of Duarte, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225. As a
business establishment, the Rotary Club of Duarte and Rotary International could
not discriminate in California.
Minnesota used much the same reasoning to find-that the Jaycees is a business.
United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). In analyzing
whether the Jaycees is a business, the Court noted the fact that it "sells goods and
extends privileges i exchange for annual membership dues." McClure, 305 N.W.2d
at 768.
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religion, ancestry or national origin are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or services in all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever."10 9 By specifying "of every kind
whatsoever," the California legislature expanded the old definition of
"public accommodations" to include many more entities,110 and invited
courts to define business as broadly as possible."' California courts,
therefore, do not limit the term to profit-making organizations, and
may also view non-profit entities as businesses. 112
California's approach, however, stretches the definition of "busi-
ness" to an extreme with which most courts or legislatures would
probably be uncomfortable. While some states have been willing to
examine quasi-private clubs to determine whether they are actually
businesses, 113 most states are unlikely to adopt California's expansive
definition. States that bar discrimination in business might not, there-
fore, bar quasi-private clubs from discriminating. An exception may
occur in clubs that have many business attributes. If an employer pays
its employees' membership dues, or if dues are deducted as business
expenses, the club may be considered a business. A club may also be
deemed a business if it serves as the location for business deals, con-
tacts, or meetings.
4. Exemptions for Private or Distinctly Private Clubs
Many states, in defining "public accommodations," specifically exempt
"private" or "distinctly private" clubs from their laws.114 Courts in these
states must define "private" or "distinctly private" when faced with
discrimination claims against quasi-private clubs. In many courts, the
trend has been to narrow the definition of "private" so that more quasi-
private clubs are barred from discriminating.
109. CA_ Crv. CoDE § 51 (West 1982).
110. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners' Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (Cal. 1983).
ini. "[Tihe term 'business establishments' was used in the broadest sense reasonably
possible." Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612 (Cal. 1962).
112. Burks, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
113. See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
114. Some state statutes that contain such an exemption are Aiuz. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1441(2) (1989); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-2502(24) (1981); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5 (West 1992); N.Y. Exac. LAw § 292(9) (McKinney 1993); OR. tv.
STAT. § 30.675(2) (1979).
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The discussion concerning what is a "private" club generally began
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which exempts "private clubs" from
its reach. 1 5 Many restaurants began to call themselves private in an
attempt to evade the statute. It was clear that such claims were merely
pretexts in order to permit dliscrimination.116 Eventually, the facts
became less obvious and courts were forced to create a test to define a
"private" club. The test included the following factors:
(1) An organization which has permanent machinery estab-
lished to carefully screen applicants for membership and who
selects or rejects such applicants on any basis or no basis at
all; (2) which limits the use of the facilities and the services of
the organization strictly to members and bona fide guests of
members in good standing; (3) which organization is con-
trolled by the membership either in the form of general meet-
ings or in some organizational form that would and does
permit the members to select and elect those member officers
who control and direct the organization; (4) which organi-
zation is non-profit and operated solely for the benefit and
pleasure of the members; and (5) whose publicity, if any, is
directed solely and only to members for their information and
guidance." 7
While this test became the accepted definition of "private," it did
not answer the question of what is a "distinctly private" club. Several
states exempt only those clubs that are "distinctly private," rather than
merely "private," from their antidiscrimination laws. 118 When courts in
these states analyze a club to determine if it is "distinctly private," they
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-2000(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
116. In one such case a court noted that a restaurant'was changed into a so-called private
dub on the day the Civil Rights Act went into effect. Katzenbach v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 91-92 (E.D. La. 1967). Membership in the "dub"
was not required for whites to eat in the restaurant nor was there a membership fee.
Katzenbach, 265 F. Supp. at 93. Also, membership cards were sent to regular
customers without having been requested. Katzenbach, 265 F. Supp. at 93. In that
case, the court had no difficulty determining that it was not in fact a private dub.
Katzenbach, 265 F. Supp. at 94.
117. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 E Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The Cork Club
called itself private, as did most Texas reitaurants that wanted to serve alcohol,
because Texas law allowed only private dubs to serve intoxicating drinks. Wright,
315 F. Supp. at 1153.
I18. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-5 (West, 1992).
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generally begin with the Cork Club definition of a "private" club.119
They then determine what additional indicia are required by the use of
the word "distinctly." 120
When the statutes do not define "distinctly," courts have a wide
range of options in deciding which, if any, types of quasi-private clubs
to include in the scope of their state's antidiscrimination laws. Judges
could choose to read "distinctly" as a modifier of "private," thereby
according it little meaning. In such a case, any bona fide club would be
exempt from the public accommodations law. 121 Over the years, some
state courts which had originally interpreted "distinctly private" to
exempt many quasi-private clubs later adopted a different definition,
which now bars discrimination in a greater number of organizations. 122
119. See United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d
1199, 1204 (N.Y.'1983).
120. Basic rules of statutory construction dictate that every word in a statute must have
meaning. Estate of Cowart v. Nicldos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992).
121. An example of such a reading of "distinctly" private can be found in Kiwanis Int'l
v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986). The Kiwanis Club of
Ridgewood, New Jersey decided to admit women, and the national organization
sought to revoke its trademark license. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468. The
Kiwanis Club of Ridgewood claimed that it would violate the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination if it barred women, and the federal district court concurred.
Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d at 471. The Third Circuit, however, reversed,
finding that Kiwanis is not a public accommodation under New Jersey law.
Ridgewood KIwanis Club, 806 F.2d at 477.
The agency charged with enforcing New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
was not persuaded by the ruling. It made a motion to reconsider and for en banc
review asserting that the court misinterpreted New Jersey law and a divided court
(by a 5-4 vote) denied the petition. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 811 F.2d at 248,
Shortly after the petition was denied, the State of New Jersey Department of Law
and Public Safety, Division on Civil Rights made a ruling in a case involving
Princeton University's all male eating dubs ordering the clubs to admit women and
showing that it would not interpret the law as did the circuit court. See Frank v.
Trustees of Princeton Univ., et al. Docket Nos. PL-05-1678, 1679, 1680, OAL
Dkr. No. Crt. 5042-85, May 16, 1987, affid, Frank v. Ivy Club, 576 A.2d 241
(N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
122. New York is one such state that has changed its interpretation of the "distinctly pri-
vate" dub exemption to its public accommodations law. N.Y. Exac. Law § 292(9)
(McKinney 1993). While a case in the 1970s found that the Kiwanis Club was
distinctly private, Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Kiwanis Int'l, 363 N.E.2d 1378 (N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977), six
years later the New York courts took a much more expansive view of New York's
public accommodations law and found that an organization which trained people in
boating skills and was nonselective except that it refused membership to women was
not distinctly private. United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (N.Y. 1983), reargument dismissed, 455 N.E.2d
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In the end, a broader reading seems more appropriate. Because of
the remedial purpose of the statutes, 123 most states interpret their
antidiscrimination laws liberally, so as to include as many instances of
discrimination as would be reasonable. These courts have found that
because discrimination injures the entire community, not just the
person discriminated against, a wide-ranging remedy is required. 124
If state courts liberally construe their antidiscrimination statutes as
described above, many more seemingly private clubs would not be
permitted to discriminate. While such clubs may appear private on the
surface, a deeper examination of how they operate would reveal that
they are not "distinctly private." Thus, an organization may be non-
profit and still be barred from discriminating, especially if the general
public is invited to join.125 A selective organization could also be cov-
ered by the act,126 particularly if not all of the members participate in
the selection process. In addition, advertising to the general public for
members or about activities can hurt a quasi-private club's claim that it
should be exempt from antidiscrimination laws. 127 If part of an organi-
zation is private but other parts are open to the public, it may be found
to be a public accommodation, 128 as could an organization that ex-
1267 (N.Y. 1983).
The New York State Legislature recently passed a bill to codify a definition of
"distinctly private." See Pact Reached on Bias Law for Some Clubs, N.Y. TIMs,
June 22, 1994, at B5.
123. In New Jersey, for instance, the courts have given the law "a broadly sympathetic
construction." Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649, 653-54 (N.J. 1973). See
also Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 158 A.2d 177 (N.J.
1960). Its courts lave argued that such a reading of the law is necessary "to eradi-
cate the cancer of discrimination." Jackson v. Concord, 253 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J.
1969).
124. In a 1965 case, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote, "[The] prevention of unlaw-
ful discrimination vindicates not only the rights of individuals but also the vital
interests of the State. In short, such discrimination is regarded as a public wrong
not merely a private grievance." David v. Vesta Co., 212 A.2d 345, 359 (N.J.
1965).
125. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974), affd, 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974).
126. Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161 (N.J. 1966).
127. "An establishment which caters to the public or by advertising or other forms of
invitation induces patronage generally is a place of public accommodation." Sellers
v. Philip's Barber Shop, 217 A.2d 121, 123 (N.J. 1966). Thus, a swim dub that
advertised for members but was then selective is a public accommodation. Clover
Hill Swimming Club, 219 A.2d at 165. See also Evans v. Ross, 154 A.2d 441 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959), cert. denied, 157 A.2d 362 (N.J. 1959).
128. Evans, 154 A.2d 441.
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cludes the public from only some of its activities. 129 Finally, a club's
relationship to another entity that is a public accommodation can cause
it to comeunder the reach of a state's antidiscrimination law.130
Several local governments, recognizing the difficulties courts have
with defining "distinctly private," have defined the term in their public
accommodations laws.131 Most of these statutes attempt to define clubs
that are formed primarily to enhance business opportunities as not
being distinctly private. Factors to consider in determining whether an
129. Hinden v. U.S. Power Squadrons, No. A-3104-73 (N.J. Super. Cr. App. Div., June
18, 1975), cert. denied, 69 N.J. 382 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943 (1976).
130. As the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Frank v. Ivy Club:
Where a place of public accommodation and an organization that deems
itself private share a symbiotic relationship, particularly where the alleged-
ly "private" entity supplies an essential service which is not provided by
the public accommodation, the servicing entity loses its private character
and becomes subject to laws against discrimination.
576 A.2d 241, 257 (NJ. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
131. New York City passed such an ordinance to require some of its highly prestigious
but quasi-private dubs to admit women. The statute states:
An institution, dub or place of accommodation shall not be considered in
its nature distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members,
provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees,
use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly
from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or busi-
ness.
Naw Yomu, N.Y., LocAL LAw 63 § 2 (1983). New York passed the law in part be-
cause:
One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in the business
and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain
membership organizations where business deals are often made and
personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and profes-
sional advancement are formed.
Naw YoRc, N.Y., LOCAL LAw 63 § 1 (1983).
Other cities have followed New York's lead. Philadelphia considered passing a
law similar to New York's to force the Union League Club to admit women. On
the eve of the vote on the bill and due in part to the pressure of the bill, the dub
voted to admit women. Philadelhia Club Drops All-Male Restriction, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 22, 1986, at A20. Shortly after the New York Court of Appeals ruling on the
New York City ordinance, similar bills were passed in Los Angeles and Washington,
D.C. Kenneth Reich, L.A. Council Bans Bias at Large Private Clubs, LA. Tmuws,
May 27, 1987, at 1; Lawrence Feinberg, District Bans Sex Bias at Large Clubs,
WAsH. PosT, Sept. 30, 1987, at Al.
The New York state government recently passed a similar statute. See Pact
Reached on Bias Law for Some Clubs, N.Y. TmEs, June 22, 1994, at B5.
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organization is distinctly private include: the size of the organization,
whether nonmembers pay for membership or other expenses, whether
club expenses are deducted from members' tax returns as business
expenses, whether meals are regularly served at the club, and whether,
and the extent to which, nonmembers use the club's facilities.132 While
these legislative actions are controversial, they have been upheld as
constitutional by the courts.133 The ordinances-or the threat of such
laws-have caused some quasi-private dubs to stop discriminating
against women.13 4
5. How Public Accommodations Statutes Should Be Worded
It becomes clear from the above that the wording of a public accommo-
dations law can greatly influence its interpretation by state courts.
While some courts are inclined to stretch the ordinary meaning of the
words used in an antidiscrimination statute in order to give it either a
wide or narrow application, most courts look to the actual wording of
the statute and its legislative intent to determine the reach of the stat-
ute. Whether and which quasi-private clubs will be barred from dis-
criminating will, therefore, depend in large part upon the wording of
the specific law.
In determining what language to use in antidiscrimination laws,
legislators have enacted their own views of how best to balance the
right to associate freely with the right to be free from discrimination.
132. See NEW YoRc, N.Y., LocAL. LAw 63 § 2 (1983).
133. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987),
afld 487 U.S. 1 (1988). The New York State Club Association vigorously opposed
the New York City ordinance, citing state and federal statutory and constitutional
problems with it. The New York State Club Association lost in the United States
Supreme Court as it had earlier lost in the New York Court of Appeals. New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 2, 7 (1988). The New York
Court of Appeals found that the state's and city's use of "distinctly private' inten-
tionally gave a narrower exemption than that contained in the federal law. New
York State Club Ass'n, 505 N.E.2d at 919. The Court found that the law spelled out
in concrete terms circumstances under which a dub would not be considered
distinctly private and that it was permissible. New York State Club Ass'n, 505
N.E.2d at 919-20.
134. For instance, because of the New York law, the University Club of New York voted
to admit women after the Court of Appeals ruling. E.R. Shipp, The University Club
Votes to Take Women as Members, N.Y. Timas, June 6, 1987, at A32. The Union
League Club in Philadelphia voted to admit women because of a threat by the
Philadelphia City Council to pass a similar law. Philadelphia Club Drops All-Male
Restriction, N.Y. TimEs, May 22, 1986, at A20.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
This being the case, while the question is a close one, discrimination at
prestigious and influential organizations causes too much damage to
allow it to continue unfettered by antidiscrimination laws.
More specifically, discrimination in quasi-private clubs places major
obstacles in the paths of women and minorities who are trying to break
through the "glass ceiling."135 If women and minorities are to accom-
plish this, they must be able to eat, golf, socialize, and do business in
the same places where white Anglo-Christian men do. Laws, therefore,
should be structured in such a way as to bar most quasi-private clubs
from discriminating. The most effective phrasing that has been used
bars discrimination in all but "distinctly private" clubs. 136 Legislatures
should go one step further by defining "distinctly private" in order to
alert courts to those features of a club that bring it within the public
sphere.137
C. The Constitutional Defenses Available
to Quasi-Private Clubs
Quasi-private clubs facing challenges to their discriminatory practices
may have some constitutional defenses available to them. Many mem-
bers of these clubs believe that they possess the constitutional right to
discriminate. 138 At times they base their argument on Justice Douglas'
135. The "glass ceiling" refers to the unseen barrier that has tended to prevent women
and members of minority groups from obtaining jobs at the highest echelons of
society such as chief executive officers of corporations, senior partners in law firms,
top officials in government, presidents of major universities, and the like. See
generally Carol Hymowitz & Timothy D. Schellhardt, The Glss Ceiling: Why
Women Can't Seem to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them from the Top Jobs,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 4A.
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-50) (West 1993).
137. The dangers of failing to define "distinctly private" include the possibility that
courts will have a different view than legislators as to the meaning of the term and
the possibility that litigation will be prolonged while the parties dispute the mean-
ing of the phrase. In Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (NJ. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1073 (1991), the author of this article, a Princeton undergraduate at the time,
brought sex discrimination cases against the university and its three all-male eating
dubs. The courts took 13 years to resolve the case. The primary area of dispute was
whether the clubs were "distinctly private" and therefore exempt from the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination.
138. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari by Tiger Inn, Frank v. Ivy Club, 498 U.S.
1073 (1991) (No. 90-575).
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dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 V. Irvis.'39 "The associational rights
which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all
yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or
all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or
woman who his or her associates must be." 140
The constitutional rights at issue for the clubs' defense are based
on freedom of association. The Supreme Court has divided freedom of
association into the following concepts: freedom of expressive associa-
tion and freedom of intimate association. 141 A third concept of freedom
of association should be added. This concept would stem from the right
to the free exercise of religion, 142 an argument some have used to claim
a constitutional right to discriminate.' 43 The following section explores
each aspect of freedom of association and its impact on discrimination
in quasi-private dubs. It analyzes the merits and problems with the
Supreme Court's opinions in this area and discusses other ways of
approaching freedom of association.
1. Freedom of Expressive Association
Freedom of expressive association is grounded in the First Amendment's
right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, right to free
speech, and right to freedom of assembly. 144 People cannot exercise
these rights effectively if they are not also protected in their associations
with similarly minded individuals. To safeguard political expression,
therefore, the courts have protected expressive association.
139. 407 U.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter Moose Lodge].
140. Id at 179-80 (J. Douglas, dissenting). It is useful to note that this was the dissent
to a case in which the Supreme Court found no state action in the discrimination
practiced by Moose Lodge and thus allowed the lodge to continue its racial discrim-
ination. The context of the quote is not as supportive of discrimination as its users
would have us believe. Justice Douglas specifically noted, "[ilt has been stipulated
that Moose Lodge No. 107 'is, in all respects, private in nature and does not appear
to have any public characteristics.'" Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 179 n.1 (quoting App.
23). Justice Douglas dissented because he would have found state action in Moose
Lodge's discrimination. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 181-83.
141. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
142. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
143. Pines v. Tamson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Groups formed for expressive purposes encounter opposition most
frequently when they advocate minority points of view. The Supreme
Court has occasionally protected such advocacy by recognizing a right
to freedom of association. 145 Early freedom of association cases involved
civil rights organizations. 146 More recently, politically unpopular groups
have invoked freedom of association to protect themselves from election
laws requiring financial disclosures. 147 The cases establishing a right to
freedom of association did not address discrimination, but involved
state and federal government attempts to identify people involved with
such groups or to curtail groups' activities. The Supreme Court has
145. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963). At other times, the Court has allowed the
suppression of unpopular views. See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(upholding the Smith Act, which made it a crime to be an active member of the
Communist Party).
146. The concept of freedom of association for expressive purposes derives from the free-
dom of speech and freedom of assembly clauses of the First Amendment of the
Constitution. The first case specifically recognizing freedom of association in the
political sphere arose from attempts by Alabama officials to obtain membership lists
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453. It was clear that if the officials were able to obtain those
lists, the members of the NAACP would be harassed. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
Therefore, the NAACP resisted giving up those lists. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464.
The Supreme Court held that freedom of association gave the NAACP the right to
resist such government requests. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
In another early case concerning freedom of expressive association, the Supreme
Court rejected a Virginia ban on lawyer solicitation possibly aimed at the NAACP
and the NAACP Defense Fund. The ban made it a criminal offense for a person to
tell others that their rights were being violated and at the same time to recommend
a lawyer to redress those violations. Button, 371 U.S. at 419. The Court ruled that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected this type of solicitation. Button,
371 U.S. at 428. In doing so the Court recognized that, for the NAACP, litigation
"is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all
government... for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is
thus a form of political expression." Button, 371 US. at 429.
147. Brown v. Socialist Workers' '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In both cases, federal or state governments sought to
require candidates to report the names and addresses of those who contributed to
the candidates' campaigns for elected office. Brown, 459 U.S. at 89; Buckley, 424
U.S. at 74. The authorities also wanted access to a list of expenditures for candi-
dates which would reveal with whom they did business. In Buckley, the Court
upheld the federal financial disdosure laws generally but noted that it might be
unconstitutional to require the same of minor parties. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70. In
Brown, the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) was able to show a long history of
governmental and private harassment against its members and supporters. Brown,
459 U.S. at 99-100. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the SWP had a
right to withhold the lists. Brown, 459 U.S. at 102.
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been less willing to invoke freedom of expressive association to protect
quasi-private clubs from state attempts to bar their discrimination.148
While quasi-private clubs might argue that they are now politically
unpopular, and thereby require protection, disputes involving these
clubs raise different issues than did earlier freedom of association cases.
Where the Court has recognized freedom of expressive association,
attempts to regulate the organizations have been largely based on state
opposition to the groups' political positions. 149 The regulations involved
in major quasi-private club discrimination cases have been aimed not at
the clubs' political objectives but at their discriminatory membership.
Since the Supreme Court rejected clubs' claims that membership dis-
crimination was related to their expressive activities, the Court found
that the clubs enjoyed no right to discriminate based on freedom of
expressive association. 150
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case in which a quasi-
private club was sued for discrimination and was able to establish a
genuine connection between its discrimination and its expressive activi-
ties. When such a case arises, the organization's freedom of expressive
association claims will be much harder to reject.
Overtly political organizations are the ones most likely to demon-
strate successfully a genuine relationship between their discriminatory
148. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("The right to
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that
right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
149. In the election cases, while the government was not seeking disclosure because of
opposition to particular candidates since all candidates were required to make
disclosures, the groups seeking protection had suffered years of governmental
harassment because of their espoused goals. See, e.g., Socialist Workers' Party v.
Attorney Gen. of the United States, 642 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
150. Justice Brennan, for the majority, noted in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627:
There is ... no basis in the record for concluding that admission of
women as full voting members will impede the organization's ability to
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.
The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the inter-
ests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's
ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different
from those of its existing members.
See also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548
(1987).
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practices and their objectives. Often, were a representative of the ex-
cluded group permitted to participate, the ability of the other members
of the organization to explore their problems and develop solutions
would be negatively affected, even if the outsider supported the goals
and purpose of the organization. Members may not feel free to speak
about their problems, goals, and proposed solutions when others of
different backgrounds are present. This is most evident for people who
are part of groups that have traditionally been exploited. Moreover, if
outsiders are members of a more powerful group, they may tend to
dominate the organization's leadership.
Organizations formed to advance gender- or race-based interests
might successfully withstand legal challenge by linking membership dis-
crimination to their political goals. While courts might bar a women's
breakfast club from discriminating, a women's consciousness-raising
group could likely show that the inclusion of men would contravene its
purpose.151 A men's rights organization which bars women because it
was formed to give men an opportunity to discuss ways in which men
are disadvantaged as males, and then to work to overcome those disad-
vantages would be equally successful in passing this constitutional test.
Another organization which could pass this constitutional test might be
a campus African-American group seeking to advance the interests of
African-American students while excluding white students.
As this argument would also be successful for a Ku Klux Klan
chapter seeking to exclude African Americans or for the Nazi Party
trying to exclude Jews, advocates of equality may oppose it. The Ku
Klux Klan would argue that its very purpose is to support white su-
premacy and to subjugate African Americans, and that the admission of
African Americans would hinder that purpose. Similarly, the Nazi Party
might argue that a basic tenet of Nazism is the "inferiority of the
Jewish race," and that allowing Jews membership would hinder the
Party's aims. As repulsive as these arguments are, it is difficult to recog-
nize a constitutional right and not apply it uniformly. 152 In a sense,
151. Moreover, having men present could in fact interfere with a free discussion of issues
and needs. For instance, if men could attend such meetings, a woman's boy-
friend/husband might come with her to such a meeting. It is unlikely that in such
circumstances she would be able to talk about problems she may be having at
home, especially issues concerning sex, conflicts over money, and conflicts over
domestic responsibilities.
152. Some might argue that groups which serve the disempowered should be able to dis-
criminate while those that serve the empowered should have their right to discrimi-
nate limited. However, "a law that explicitly differentiates between men's and
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those who advocate an expansion of freedom must respond with the
famous defense of liberty, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it."153
At the same time, recognizing a right to discriminate in member-
ship does not require allowing discriminatory groups to act on their
beliefs in ways that threaten others. For instance, burning crosses to
intimidate African Americans or painting swastikas to intimidate Jews
may lead to civil suits against these groups for civil rights violations. 154
Such activities may also lead to criminal charges of arson, criminal
mischief, trespass, or other possible offenses, as well as to penalty en-
hancements for the hate aspects of the crime. 155 Such penalty enhance-
ments have been passed because of the impact that hate crimes have on
the broader community. That impact can lead to wide-scale riots, as in
the Rodney King case, or to other forms of trauma. 156
women's associations, while theoretically defensible, may prove politically unpalat-
able." Deborah L. Rhode, Association andAssimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. Ray. 106, 127
(1986).
153. Attributed to Voltaire. THE OxFoRD DIcTIoNARY OF QUOTATONs 561 (3rd ed.
1979) (citing S.G. TELLENTmR, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907)).
154. See Saint Francis College v. Al Khazriji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare Tifela Con-
gregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). Among the civil rights that these groups
may be violating is the right to travel across state lines. This right may even be
violated if the cross or swastika were placed on public grounds and if it could be
shown that the purpose of this action was to scare African Americans or Jews away
from a community or from a university by invoking the violence those symbols
represent. In doing so, the actors would make African Americans or Jews afraid that
they would become victims of violence should they come. An excellent example of
a situation in which this argument might be useful would be the recent cross
burnings in Dubuque, Iowa. They began after the city council decided that there
were too few people of color in the community. The council therefore passed a plan
to try to encourage people of color to move to Dubuque. After the plan was
announced, a small group started burning crosses in the city and white supremacists
began to march. Clearly, an argument could be based on these facts that those who
were burning the crosses were doing so to discourage people of color from moving
to Dubuque, a violation of the right to interstate travel. Deborah Wiley, Breaking
the Barriers of Hate: Dubuque Grapples with Racism, DEs MoINs REG., Nov. 17,
1991, at lB.
155. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (upholding penalty enhancements
when race is the motive for a crime).
156. For instance, in March 1994, this author's synagogue was defaced with antisemitic
and pro-Nazi graffiti, including statements such as "go home Jew" and "remember
Holocaust," and numerous swastikas. Tom Alex, D.M. Synagogue Defaced; Police
Seek Vandals, DES MoiNms REG., Mar. 4, 1994, at IA. There was a large scale
response from the religious and political communities that helped the Jewish
community to heal. Yet, this author and many of her friends still felt deep trauma
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW [
A conflict between rights to inclusion and free speech arose
recently in New York City.15 7 The sponsors of the annual St. Patrick's
Day parade, the New York County and State Boards of the Ancient
Order of Hiberians (the Hiberians) refused to allow the Irish Lesbian
and Gay Organization (ILGO) to participate in the parade.15" The
ILGO challenged the Hiberians before the New York City Commission
of Human Rights and in federal district court, claiming that the
Hiberians were illegally discriminating against them on the basis of
sexual orientation. 159 The New York Civil Liberties Union defended the
organizers, arguing that the Hiberians had an expressive association
right to discriminate160 because the parade was organized to celebrate
Irish and Roman Catholic pride,161 and because the ILGO had a view
that was "contrary to the teachings of [the] Catholic faith." 162 The
ILGO argued that the parade was a government action and that under
New York City law the Hiberians could not discriminate against them
on the basis of their sexual orientation.16 3 The administrative judge for
the New York City Human Rights Commission recommended that the
Commission rule against the ILGO based on the freedom of expressive
association claim. 164 The district court then ruled against the ILGO,
for several weeks. Some Holocaust survivors were unable to look at the synagogue;
others dissolved in tears and trembled in fear upon seeing the graffiti and being
reminded of the horrors through which they had lived.
157. A similar dispute arose in 1993 over the Salute to Israel Parade, although it was
never taken to court. The, sponsors of the parade in New York did not want to
allow Congregation Beth Simchat Torah, the gay synagogue in New York, to
participate in the parade because of objections by some Orthodox Jewish groups to
homosexuality. In defending the Congregation, others noted that the Israeli Army
does not even bar gays and lesbians from serving and that the parade is not a
reflection of Jewish doctrine but of support to Israel. A compromise was brokered
shortly before the parade to allow the Congregation to march. When the issue was
reported in the New York Times, however, the parade organizers again barred the
synagogue. Ultimately, they were barred from marching. See Alan Finder, Parade
Furor: Salute to Israel Uninvites Gay Group, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1993, at A23.
158. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. New York State Bd. of Ancient Order of Hiberians,
788 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
159. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 . Supp. at 174.
160. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 R Supp. at 177.
161. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 E Supp. at 177.
162. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 174.
163. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 E Supp. at 176.
164. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 E Supp. at 175. The Human Rights Commission
later overruled the administrative law judge and ordered the Hiberians to permit
ILGO to march in their next parade. New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of
Hiberians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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refusing to grant them the preliminary injunction that would have
allowed the group to participate in the 199z parade.165
This use of the freedom of association argument presents a close
case. The Hiberians, however, eventually persuaded the court that the
message of their parade was "to honor the patron saint of Ireland and
to proclaim their allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church .... ,166
Because of this, the court found that by ignoring the parade's political
message, and by ordering them to include the ILGO, New York City
had violated the Hiberians' free speech rights.167
Before a court permits an organization to discriminate, it should
continue to require that a discriminatory practice is necessary to the
expressive message that an organization wishes to convey. Courts should
uphold an organization's right to discriminate only if that organization
demonstrates a strong relationship between its expressive activities and
its discrimination. If courts require a lesser showing of such a relation-
ship, clubs may make expressive claims that are in fact pretextual.
2. Freedom of Intimate Association
Quasi-private clubs challenged for their discriminatory practices defend
themselves more often on the basis of a right to freedom of intimate
association, which can be a far stronger defense, than on expressive
association rights. Such intimate association rights are based on both a
right to privacy 168 and on notions of intimacy contained in the First l6 9
and Fourth Amendments. 170 Initially, the Supreme Court recognized
freedom of intimate association in issues concerning marriage, 171 child-
rearing, 172 and child-bearing.' 7 3
165. Irish Lesbian and Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 179.
166. New York County Bd ofAndent Order of Hiberians, 814 E Supp. at 367.
167. New York County Bd. ofAndent Order of Hiberians, 814 E Supp. at 369.
16s. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
171. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
172. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
173. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This history was traced by
Justice Brennan in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
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Because some small groups function as an extended family,174 the
expansion of intimate association rights to such organizations was
reasonable. The Supreme Court then recognized a right to intimate
association in small organizations that function like extended families,
but no such group has yet presented itself to the Court. The Court first
applied the test of freedom of intimate association to quasi-private clubs
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.175 In that case, the Court developed
a framework for analyzing quasi-private clubs' claims that their constitu-
tional right to discriminate should override state public accommoda-
tions laws. The Court listed the following relevant factors: "size, pur-
pose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in
a particular case may be pertinent."176 The Jaycees, with approximately
295,000 members in 7400 local chapters involving 400 to 430 members
each, and affiliated with fifty-one state organizations, 177 were clearly not
the type of intimate. association that merited constitutional protection.
In addition, while the organization admitted only males between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five, 178 older people and women participated
in many Jaycees' functions, thus making the organization non-seclu-
sive. 179 Moreover, Minnesota's courts had found that one of the Jay-
cees' purposes was to sell memberships, which qualified it as a busi-
ness. 
18 0
Seclusivity is one factor relevant to determining whether a club has
the right to discriminate. If nonmembers participate in the club's
activities and are simply refused membership, the club members are not
expressing a desire to refrain from associating with them. Likewise, if an
organization is so large that its members cannot all know each other,
requiring admission of individuals from an excluded group is not a
major imposition on members' associational rights.
174. Justice Brennan explained the reason for protecting intimate associations:
"[Individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safe-
guards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
175. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
176. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
177. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
178. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
179. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
i80. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616.
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Selectivity is also a relevant issue, because if anyone can become a
member, then granting membership is not indicative of a true desire to
associate with a particular individual. If only a small subset of the
membership chooses whom to admit, membership in the group does
not indicate a close personal tie between members. Without that inti-
mate relationship, associational rights are not imposed upon too severely
by the requirement that additional people be granted membership.
Finally, the purpose of an organization is relevant in determining
whether its discrimination can be regulated. As discussed above, if the
organization has formed for expressive purposes, it is likely to succeed
with its assertions of a right to discriminate. Organizations that have
formed primarily for business purposes have much more limited rights
to discriminate. The state's interest in enabling all of its citizens to
participate in commerce is compelling and overrides a club's claim of a
right to discriminate. An organization which purports to serve another
public accommodation may also face strong arguments against any
claim of a right to discriminate.181
Following the Roberts decision, there was uncertainty as to how the
Supreme Court's test would be applied. Women's groups hoped that
the test would be interpreted liberally to limit such organizations' ability
to discriminate. By using the Roberts criteria to define "private" and
"distinctly private" clubs,' 82 some women helped initiate legislative
efforts to bar quasi-private club discrimination. Others were more
conservative in forecasting the effects of the decision. While some
argued that Roberts could result in successful litigation against quasi-
private clubs,18 3 others predicted that the case would be limited to its
181. See Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
182. See infra part III.
183. See Ann M. Overbeck, Case Note, 53 U. CN. L. Rav. 1173, 1191 (1984):
A successful challenge to the sex-discriminatory policies of a private dub
that offers its members business opportunities and contacts, a challenge
based on a state or city's public accommodations law, has a very good
chance of being held constitutional. In other words, a dub that is a
.public business" in the context of a public accommodations law probably
will not be entitled to a constitutionally protected right of expressive
association or a constitutionally protected right of intimate association. If
there is any hope for private dubs that want to retain their all-male
memberships, it lies in the future development of the freedom of intimate
association.
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facts, believing that any club more selective than the Jaycees would
receive constitutional protection for its discriminatory practices.'1 4 Still
others viewed the decision as allowing states and courts great leeway to
determine whether quasi-private clubs were subject to antidiscrimination
laws. 185
Many quasi-private organizations took the position that the opin-
ion was limited to the facts of the Roberts case. For example, Kiwanis
International reaffirmed its all-male membership policy after the deci-
sion was rendered. 186 At their next convention, however, the Jaycees
voted to admit women. 187
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court applied the Roberts criteria
so as to bar discrimination in two major quasi-private clubs. 188 These
See also Gerald L. Edgar, Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Does the Right of
Free Association Imply an Absolute Right of Private Discrimination?, 1986 UTAH L.
Rnv. 373, 397:
Public accommodation legislation will probably be subject to liberal inter-
pretation by the courts in order to render discriminatory private organiza-
tions subject to such legislation. Individuals suffering the adverse effects of
such discrimination may also be more encouraged to bring actions against
offending organizations with a greater hope of success.
184. See Rebecca A. Greenberg, Case Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Impact of
Sex Discrimination in Private Organizations, 20 NEw ENG. L. Rnv. 831, 854-55
(1984-85).
185. See Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
82 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1878, 1900-01 (1984):
The Court has kept its options open. Should it choose to do so, U.S.
Jaycees could be extended to uphold the application of antidiscrimination
statutes to organizations as diverse as the Rotary International, the Girl
Scouts, the Elks, or the Sons of Norway. More probably, language in the
opinion will be used by courts to limit application of antidiscrimination
statutes to a handful of organizations which employ the Jaycees' unusually
aggressive recruitment policies.
See also Brendan Dolan, Note, Private Club Discrimination Can Be Outlawed:
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 19 U.S.F. L. Ray. 413, 428 (1985): "The impact
of Roberts v. United States Jaycees will be limited. Many states will not attempt to
prosecute discriminatory membership organizations."
186. Idwanis Bars Women in Closest Vote on Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1986, at A14.
187. Jaycees Vote to Admit Women to Membership, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 17, 1984, at A8.
188. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
[hereinafter Rotary]; New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1 (1988). In Rotary, the Court found that a California decision, ruling that the
organization was subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51
(West 1982), was not unconstitutional. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547. While Rotary had
over 900,000 members in about 20,000 dubs nationally, it differed from the
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three cases, Roberts, Rotary, and New York State Club Ass'n, were each
rendered without dissent, showing the Court's willingness to uphold
local and state ordinances designed or interpreted to stop quasi-private
club discrimination.
This trend could mean that large quasi-private dubs which serve as
business facilitators could be required by state or local laws to stop
discriminating. For example, in instances involving clubs that serve
lunch and country clubs where business is conducted on the golf
course, courts will likely rule against defenses based on a right to inti-
mate association.18 9
Discriminatory organizations formed in response to discrimination
by major clubs could also be barred from discriminating. There are
Jaycees primarily in the fact that it had selection criteria that went beyond suspect
classes. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 540. These criteria were to ensure that there were not
too many of any single professional group in each dub. Still, this was not enough
to merit constitutional protection. The courts had viewed the organization in terms
of its business interests and its interest in obtaining business for its membership.
Rotary, 481 U.S. at 542. Considering its size, purpose, lack of sedusivity, and
minimal selectivity, the Supreme Court found that there was no violation of
Rotary's right to freedom of intimate association in requiring -the organization to
grant membership to women. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547.
The Court handled New York State Club Ass'n in a similar fashion. 487 U.S. 1
(1988). In that case, the Club Association made a facial challenge to the New York
City ordinance that was designed to eliminate discrimination in the major quasi-
private clubs in New York City. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 5-6. As a
facial challenge, the organization had to show great overbreadth in the statute or
that the statute could never be applied in a constitutional manner. New York State
Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 11. Thus, the Court did not need to examine the specifics
of any one dub in deciding this case. The Court found that the law could in fact
be applied constitutionally under the Jaycees and Rotary criteria. New York State
Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 14. The statute governed only clubs with more than 400
members and with regular meal service for which the dubs receive payments
directly or indirectly from or for nonmembers to further business. NEw YoRK,
N.Y., LocA. LAw 63 § 2 (1983).
189. A relatively easy way to determine if a dub is actually a place that facilitates a busi-
ness is to use discovery to learn the number of businesses that pay for employee
dues or bills at the dubs and the number of members who deduct dub expenses
from their taxes as business expenses. The dubs should retain records showing who
pays their bills. Members could be required through interrogatories to state under
oath whether they take business tax deductions for their membership and/or expens-
es at the dub. Wlifle a plaintiff would probably be barred from reviewing the tax
returns of every member, such an interrogatory would not be unduly intrusive. The
dubs should not be permitted to claim that they are purely social and also daim
that members' activities at the dubs are business-oriented. The New York City
ordinance was aimed at these kinds of characteristics and thus indicated how to gain
the necessary proof. See Naw Youc, N.Y., LocAL LAw 63 § 1 (1983).
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many such women's clubs. Defenders of these organizations might
argue that, because -there is a strong "old boys' network" which will
likely remain in place for a long time, women must form an "old girls'
network."
There are at least two problems with this approach. One is that
the "old girls' network" will never be a substitute for entry into the
"old boys' network." Men have greater access to prestigious jobs; their
networks are, therefore, more useful. Until women enjoy equality in the
workplace, a women's group will not be able to provide the same access
to business that a men's group can provide. At the same time, allowing
an all-women's business club would also require that all-men's business
clubs be permitted, thus perpetuating women's unequal status in the
workplace. While it may be tempting to allow women, who have long
suffered discrimination, to form their own business clubs, such action is
ultimately counterproductive. 190
The arguments for single-sex health clubs and sports leagues, which
are based on privacy interests and real biological differences between
men and women, are more compelling, though in most cases they
should also fail. While separate locker rooms are necessary for privacy
concerns, there is really no need for exclusively single-sex health clubs.
Some activities may be separated if a real need can be shown. 191 Gener-
ally, however, joint participation should be encouraged. Most public
accommodations laws require it because athletic facilities are defined as
public accommodations in many state statutes.192 The Constitution
does not prohibit states from requiring health clubs to admit members
without discrimination. It does, however, protect those members'
privacy interests in having single-sex locker rooms and some single-sex
activities, if those activities are equally available to women and men. 193
190. Similar arguments can and will be made about racial, ethnic, and religious dubs
formed at least in part for business purposes.
191. For instance, some exercises are designed for either men or women to strengthen
musdes that are particularly vulnerable for one sex but not for the other. Saunas are
typically occupied by people who are not wearing clothes. Men and women have a
privacy interest in sharing saunas with members of only one sex at a time. Other
types of exercise classes should be open without discrimination although many
people would say that some would be uncomfortable exercising in front of the other
sex. While this discomfort cannot be ignored, it is based on social conditioning, and
in the balance, the damage done by discrimination is too serious to allow arguments
of discomfort to succeed in the face of antidiscrimination laws.
192. See, e.g., NJ. Smv. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1993).
193. The constitutional right should derive from the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Four-
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In professional sports, the issue concerns employment opportunities
rather than access to public accommodations. The bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exception to Title VII's bar of gender-based employ-
ment discrimination 194 could allow a separate women's professional golf
or tennis tour. 195 In sports which do not offer separate and nearly equal
professional opportunities for men and women, like baseball, hockey, or
basketball, women should be permitted to try out for the men's
teams. 196 The controversy arises most often when men seek to compete
on women's teams or in women's tournaments. Because men are gener-
ally stronger than women, women fear that men will take over the team
or will dominate strength-related sports. There is a basis to argue that if
a significant number of men are interested in a sport, they should be
encouraged to form- their own leagues. In any situation in which too
few are interested, the sport should allow anyone to compete and
determine teams on individual talent and skill, not sex.
In school sports programs, Title IXx97 requires that unless separate
teams are provided for men and women in the same sport, both sexes
must be allowed to compete on the same team. 198 Courts have also
interpreted public accommodations laws to prohibit discrimination in
children's sports programs. 199 A freedom of association argument has
teenth Amendments, as does the right to privacy and to intimate association.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988). Recognizing the biological difference in men's and
women's upper body strengths could result in a finding that sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification at least in those sports that have different, yet nearly
equal, professional outlets for men and women.
195. This became controversial when Dr. Renee Richards, who had competed in the
men's professional tennis tour before undergoing a sex-change operation, tried to
compete in the women's tour. Eventually, she was permitted to compete with the
women but lost to them. Neil Amdur, Renee Richards Ruled Eligiblefor U.S. Open,
N.Y. Tims, Aug. 17, 1977, at B7; Neil Amdur, Dr. Richards Put in Main Draw of
U.S. Open, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 18, 1977, at B17.
196. Differences in body build between men and women which justify different sports
leagues cannot, of course, justify preventing women from being umpires in major
league baseball or referees in professional football or basketball.
197. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1988).
198. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1988). There have even been rulings to this effect involving
a field hockey team. Williams v. School Dist., 988 F.2d 168 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Recently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has mandated that
colleges and universities provide scholarships to women athletes in nearly equal
numbers to the number provided to male athletes, because of the requirements of
Title IX. Alexander Wolff, Trickle Down Economics, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 25,
1993, at 84.
199. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super.
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not protected these programs from challenge, because the programs are
often large and open to any male who wants to compete for a place on
the team. Instead, these challenges succeed or fail based solely on state
and federal employment discrimination or public accommodations laws.
Private all-women's colleges have argued strongly for the right to
continue as single-sex institutions. While colleges' single-sex enrollment
policies are exempt from Tide IX200 and from most public accommoda-
tions laws, public all-male colleges have faced challenges in the courts.
One federal district court judge ruled that Virginia Military Institute's
(VMI) sex discrimination was lawful because it served to diversify
educational options, and that admitting women to the school would
"alter the adversative environment that VMI students must now en-
dure."20 1 The appellate court reversed, finding that Virginia either had
to permit women to enroll, or offer them similar opportunities. 20 2
The argument for all-women's schools is more persuasive, as stud-
ies have shown that females in coeducational schools are called on less
frequently and are given less encouragement than males.203 But while it
may seem that the government's interest in providing quality education
to women and girls might be best served by including the option of
single-sex schools, 20 4 this practice may encourage different treatment,
thereby increasing discrimination. The state and public interests in a
quality education for women and girls would be better served by mak-
Ct. App. Div. 1974), afdt 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1988).
201. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-13 (.D. Va. 1991), rev'd,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
202. United States v. Virginia, 976 E2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). Thus, the court found
that sex discrimination in public colleges was allowed under the Constitution so
long as the state provided a separate but equal education for men and women,
'While this opinion is certainly better than the district court's opinion, it is still
troubling because it perpetuates the notion of separate but equal, which was wholly
rejected when applied to race discrimination in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). In a similar case against the Citadel, a public all-male military school
in South Carolina, a federal judge recently ordered the admission of a woman to
the corps of cadets. Mary Jordan, Citadel Ordered to Admit Woman, WASH. PosT,
July 23, 1994, at Al.
203. See Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, Efficts of Single-Sex Secondary Schools on
Student Achievement and Attitudes, 78 J. EDUC. PsYCoI 381 (1986).
204. An all-women's school might meet the test for public sex discrimination; the dis-
crimination is to achieve the important governmental objective of giving women a
quality education and is substantially related to that objective. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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ing all public schools coeducational, while permitting single-sex private
schools.
A college social organization (CSO) may also face challenges if it
discriminates in membership decisions. Fraternities and sororities usually
are open to only one sex, and they also have traditions of racial and
religious discrimination. Because African Americans and Jews were not
historically permitted to join the most prestigious fraternities and sorori-
ties, they formed their own groups.20 5 Now, while few if any fraterni-
ties and sororities openly maintain racial or religious bars, the tradition
of separate CSOs is still reflected in the membership of the different
groups.
College social organizations argue fiercely for exemption from
discrimination laws on the basis of intimate association. These organiza-
tions usually have only a small, highly selective undergraduate member-
ship and provide their members with close relationships similar to
family.20 6 Also, to the extent that a fraternity or sorority functions as a
dormitory, the members may have a privacy right to single-sex hous-
ing.207
A more thorough examination of CSOs' attributes, however, shows
that the Constitution should not bar states208 from regulating discrimi-
nation in fraternities, sororities, or other CSOs. 20 9 Fraternities and
205. Now, the African-American fraternity system differs from the white system in that
the students in the African-American fraternities and sororities are often far more
involved in community service activities than are students in the white system. The
African-American fraternities and sororities also often help their members form a
positive self-image and make them feel more comfortable, especially on predomi-
nantly white campuses. To the extent that an African-American fraternity or
sorority does discriminate based on race in membership and can show that the
discrimination is due to and necessary for its expressive associational activity, it
might be able to withstand the challenge of a discrimination. See infra part III.
206. See Coloton, supra note 48.
207. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(g) (West 1993). If a statute did not recognize that
right and forced organizations to have both men and women live in their facility,
the sorority or fraternity might have a constitutional challenge based on the right to
privacy and intimate association in living quarters. While that right might protect
living arrangements, it might not affect rulings on membership.
208. The federal statute governing discrimination in schools, Title IX, exempts social fra-
ternities and sororities. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
209. See Daniel L. Schwartz, Note, Discrimination on Campus: A Critical Examination of
Single-Sex College Social Organizations, 75 CAI. L. Rav. 2117 (1987). For example,
in New Jersey, the Division on Civil Rights ruled that Princeton University's eating
clubs do not have a freedom of association right to discriminate because they are
too large, nonselective, and nonsedusive to claim constitutional protection. See
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sororities are usually large national organizations; 2 10 the members of one
chapter usually do not know and have no participation in choosing the
members of another chapter. Similarly, alumni/ae neither know nor
participate in choosing the undergraduate members. Universities often
rely on the fraternities and sororities to feed, house, and/or provide a
social life for a portion of their students. This reliance could be seen as
another equally important purpose of the organization, in addition to
the social purpose described above. Another limit on the CSOs'
associational claims is the function that these groups play in the "old
boy's" network. Prestigious CSOs provide entry into business and
government opportunities upon graduation. 211 Finally, nonmembers
usually participate in most, if not all, fraternity and sorority activities.
The above analysis suggests that only truly private clubs should
succeed in gaining constitutional protection from state or federal laws
against discrimination. 2 12 This does not mean, however, that other
clubs will lose all rights to association. They may still set their own
criteria for membership, and choose the activities in which they want to
engage. Also, any order to cease discrimination must use the least
restrictive means to achieve the state's compelling interest in ending
discrimination.213 Consequently, the infringement on freedom of associ-
ation that would come with barring discrimination would be limited to
preventing the harm that society has found to stem from discrimina-
tion. It is likely that the Supreme Court will be receptive to attempts to
Frank v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., Docket Nos. PL-05-1678, 1679, 1680, OAL
Dkt. No. Crt. 5042-85, May 16, 1987, affd, Frank v. Ivy Club, 548 A.2d 1142
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 576.A.2d 241 (N.J.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991).
210. For a complete description of the fraternity and sorority system, see Fa~rATRNm.S
AND SORORITIES ON THE CONTEMPORARY COLLEGE CAMPUS (Roger B. Wunston et
al. eds., 1987).
211. Rattling the Bonesmen, Tm, Apr. 29, 1991, at 33.
212. Such a dub might be an all-women's Monday Night Football dub made up of ten
women. All know each other and meet only with each other while they watch
Monday Night Football. A new member is added only when all know her and want
her included. No tax deductions are made for expenses related to the dub, and its
purpose is purely social. A similar all-men's cooking club would likewise be pro-
tected.
213. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984). Similarly, it was
important to the Court's ruling in New York State Club Ass'n v. Ciy of New York
that membership could still be restricted on other grounds. It was merely that being
a member of a suspect class could not be used as a criterion for exclusion from
membership. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988).
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bar discrimination in quasi-private clubs if the litigants show that the
organization is especially large, lacks selectivity and seclusivity, has a
business or other nonsocial purpose, and has members with no preexist-
ing relationship to each other.
3. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is another potential defense for quasi-private clubs
which are challenged for discriminating. While this defense has not
often been raised in the past, it will probably be used with some fre-
quency in the future. When it is, it will likely be the most difficult of
the defenses with which to deal because of the conflicting constitutional
and policy considerations.
Several considerations need to be weighed when religion is raised
as a defense to charges of discrimination. No such defense should be
recognized unless the discrimination at issue is based on an identifiable
doctrine or tenet of the religion whose practice is in question.214 One
problem that comes from such a conclusion, however, is that courts
may be put in the position of deciding what is a doctrine or tenet of
the religion, which could be violative of the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause. Yet, there really is no other way to determine which
religious practices should be exempt from discrimination laws, unless
one allows the mere raising of the defense to exempt particular discrimi-
natory actions from the law. Such an exemption would be an invitation
to pretextual defenses.
Religious defenses may not be available at all to quasi-private clubs
if courts adopt the broadest reading possible of the recent Supreme
Court case, Employment Division, Deptartment of Human Resources v.
Smith.215 In Smith, the Court found that a generally applicable criminal
law could be applied to religious practices so long as the law was not
intended or written solely to attack a particular religious practice.
216
214. Once this defense is put forward, a question arises whether courts are an appropri-
ate body to determine what are religious doctrines or tenets in any religion. Any
attempt to determine the answer could have courts interpreting and determining
religious questions and answering religious debates.
215. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [hereinafter Smith]. That case was overturned by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993). With this statute,
state antidiscrimination laws should be subject to the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.
216. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
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Because discrimination laws are generally applicable, and are not written
or intended to reach religious organizations exclusively, a court might
not exempt religious practice from the reaches of antidiscrimination
laws. It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court would interpret
Smith so broadly.217 Moreover, state high courts are unlikely to disre-
gard the importance of the free exercise of religion and interpret Smith
in this way.
While the interplay between freedom of religion and
antidiscrimination laws will raise some close questions, it will answer
others. Under the Free Exercise Clause, for example, the government
may not interfere with rituals, even if they have discriminatory aspects.
The state should not, therefore, be able to bar Orthodox Jews from
requiring men and women to sit separately at services or from limiting
the honor of aliyot to men (calling on men to read the Torah). Similar-
ly, certain forms of employment discrimination should be exempt from
the reach of state antidiscrimination laws. The government should not,
for instance, be permitted to require the Catholic Church to ordain
women as priests nor to require an Orthodox Jewish Synagogue to
employ a woman rabbi.218
The appropriate reach of antidiscrimination laws is much more
difficult to determine as one considers issues and activities which are
not core religious activities. While a religious school can administer
discriminatory tests for its religion teachers, it is questionable whether
the school should be able to do the same for math teachers, secretaries,
or janitors.219 Also, when religious organizations provide services, they
should presumably be able to limit those services to members of the
organization or adherents to the religion. If, however, a religious group
217. Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(Supp. V 1993), overturning the Smith opinion and reinstating prior understandings
of the Free Exercise Clause.
218. Similarly, women who celebrate Rosh Chosdesh could not be barred from engaging
in discrimination. Rosh Chosdesh is traditionally a Jewish holiday especially for
women, celebrating the new moon and new Jewish month. The men are usually
excluded from the ceremonies. See SusAN" WEIDMAN SCHNEIDER, JEWISH AND
FEMALE: A GUIDE AND SOURCEBOOK FOR TODAY'S JEWISH WOMAN 94-97 (1985)
(discussing Rosh Chodesh).
219. At Catholic University, Father Curran was stripped of his tenure in the religious
education department because he had views of sexuality that were opposed by the
Pope. The issue arose whether he should have been transferred out of the seminary
to the philosophy or religion department rather than having been dismissed. Even-
tually, he left Catholic University. Lawrence Feinberg, Vatican Bars CU Priest From
Teaching Theology, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1986, at Al.
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provides services to non-adherents, should it be able to discriminate in
those services? For instance, could the group limit a soup kitchen,
which had no government funding, to only whites or only men? If the
problem of discrimination is viewed as compelling, the answers to the
above questions should be no. A religious organization should be re-
quired to provide its services to all without discrimination, unless it
limits its assistance to its own members or to adherents of its religious
views.
Many, however, disagree with these conclusions. This is particular-
ly true if they view the religious issues as far more important than the
problem of discrimination. The issue becomes more difficult when the
religious group in question deeply opposes the practices of the people
that they wish to exclude. 22 0 While these views may perpetuate discrim-
ination, negative stereotyping, and ignorance about people who are
different, they are also a fundamental part of some religious beliefs.
Although few lawsuits have involved these issues in the context of
public accommodations laws, courts have dealt with the problem in
some recent housing discrimination cases. California221 and Minneso-
ta222 courts have faced cases pitting housing discrimination laws against
claims of religious principle. In both of these cases, couples were told
that they could not rent apartments because they were not married.
The couples each claimed marital status discrimination, 223 while the
landlords, viewing unmarried cohabitation as sinful, felt that renting to
unmarried couples would violate their religious obligations. The Califor-
nia court found that the state had no compelling interest in the eradica-
tion of discrimination in housing against unmarried couples and upheld
the religious claims of the landlord.2 24
220. Some religious schools, for instance, believe that homosexuality is such a sin that a
lesbian or gay man should not teach at those schools. Those who operate some
Christian schools believe that their faith should infuse all subjects taught in the
schools, not only theology dasses. They may feel that Jews and people who adhere
to pagan religions should not be allowed to teach Christian children at their
schools.
221. Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 2 CA. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
222. Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
223. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34; French, 460 N.W.2d at 4.
224. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46. The court's reasoning was dearly affected by its
disdain for cohabitation by an unmarried couple. It noted: "[ilt is thus apparent
that although the law recognizes cohabitation as a modem reality, it has not
affirmatively promoted it as a matter of government policy." Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d. at 45.
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The Minnesota court used the state's constitution to analyze the
freedom of religion claims.225 The court found that "[t]he state may
interfere with the rights of conscience only if it can show that the
religious practice in question is 'licentious' or 'inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the state."' 226 The court held that the state could not
meet this test and upheld the freedom of religion claim.227
Both courts' rulings, however, were based more on an antipathy to
cohabitation by unmarried couples than on freedom of religion.228
Housing discrimination laws should not be overcome by religious
claims unless the housing is owned by a religious group for its adher-
ents or officials. Private housing, which is a business activity subject to
a full panoply of state and local regulations, should be subject to
antidiscrimination laws without regard to the religious beliefs of the
owners.
229
Courts have also been sympathetic to public accommodations
defenses which are based on freedom of religion. In two such cases, the
courts have balanced the state's interest in eradicating discrimination
with the defendant's interest in religion and have tried to fashion
remedies sensitive to both concerns. 230
In Pines v. Tomson,231 the defendant produced what he called the
Christian Yellow Pages (CYP) and required anyone who placed an
advertisement in the CYP to affirm that he or she was a "born-again"
Christian. An introduction in the CYP encouraged people to patronize
these advertisers. Originally, the remedial order required that the defen-
dant accept advertisements from anyone and modify its introduction to
avoid any implication of religious discrimination. The appellate court
upheld only that part of the order which prohibited CYP from de-
225. French, 460 N.W.2d at 8.
226. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
227. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9. This court was also influenced by its negative view of
cohabitation which it called "licentious practices." French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
228. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32; French, 460 N.W.2d 2.
229. Tide VIII, the Fair Housing Act, has an exemption for owner-occupied family
houses with four or fewer families. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1988). This exemption
protects religious owners from being required to rent to people to whom they
object, where those people would live in the same building with the owners and
three other families. This exemption should be preserved because of the close
relationships and dose contact among people who live in four-family houses.
230. Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
231. 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
(Vol. 2:27
1994] THE KEY TO UNLOCKING THE CLUBHOUSE DOOR 77
manding that advertisers affirm their status as "born-again" Chris-
tians. 232 Out of concern for the free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech, it rejected the requirement that CYP modify its introduction.
The court made clear that the editors of CYP did not have to endorse
any advertisers and could print disclaimers telling purchasers that CYP
was required to publish advertisements from people who may not be
"bom-again" Christians.233
In Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v.
Georgetown University, Georgetown University refused officially to
recognize its undergraduate and law school gay and lesbian organiza-
tions.234 Georgetown claimed that to recognize a student group implied
endorsement of that group.235 Because the Catholic Church condemns
homosexual behavior as sinful, Georgetown, a Jesuit and Pontifical
University,236 claimed that recognizing the groups would violate reli-
gious law.23 7
The court of appeals found that the District of Columbia had a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation.238 The court then balanced the District's interest in eradicating
discrimination and Georgetown's interest in the free exercise of reli-
gion.239 It noted that university recognition carried with it certain
benefits and services including a university mailbox, computer label
services, and the right to apply for funding from the university.240 The
court, therefore, allowed Georgetown to refuse to recognize the groups,
because it found that the law did not require an endorsement. 241 It did,
however, require Georgetown to extend to the groups all of the privi-
leges of recognition. 42 Although Georgetown did not choose to appeal
232. Pines, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 878-80.
233. Pines, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
234. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Cn, 536 A.2d at 4.
235. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 16-17.
236. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 6.
237. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctn, 536 A.2d at 18-19.
238. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Cr., 536 A.2d at 37-38. This was
one of the first appellate court opinions to find that sexual orientation was a suspect
class. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 33-36.
239. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 38.
240. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Cr., 536 A.2d at 17.
241. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 21.
242. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 39.
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to the Supreme Court, the order was eventually reversed by Con-
gress. 2
43
Both courts were sensitive to the issues involved, drawing appropri-
ate lines to protect victims of discrimination while preserving the free
exercise of religion. While public accommodations laws may be applied
to some organizations despite their religious objections, it is not clear
how far these laws should extend. For instance, a quasi-private club
which is affiliated with a house of worship such as a synagogue, church,
or mosque, should be permitted to discriminate in membership,244
since such an organization is so closely intertwined with the free exer-
cise of religion. As a discriminatory practice moves further from the
house of worship, however, it becomes less defensible. Quasi-private
clubs connected with religiously affiliated hospitals should not be enti-
tied to discriminate unless the clubs' membership is limited solely to
members or adherents of that religion. 245 Finally, Georgetown Universi-
ty, which has only a distant relationship with the Catholic Church,
should not be permitted to discriminate against its lesbian and gay male
students.
Additional close questions will undoubtedly arise as more quasi-
private clubs are challenged for discrimination and raise free exercise of
religion as a defense. Those who wish to end discrimination should
show sensitivity to free exercise claims, especially for organizations that
have a strong religious affiliation.246 At the same time, free exercise
243. First, Congress passed a statute requiring the D.C. City Council to amend the
District's human rights law or lose all government funding. Nation's Capitol Reli-
gious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 145, 102 Stat.
2269-314 (1988). This statute was found to be an unconstitutional restriction on
free speech by a federal district court in Clarke v. United States, which noted that
Congress had a less restrictive way to enact its will. 705 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C.
1988). Congress could simply enact the law itself because Congress can enact any
law governing the District of Columbia regardless of the will of the people in the
District who have no representative who can even vote on the matter. Clarke, 705 F.
Supp. at 612. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206 (1992). Congress then passed the law
overturning the decision itself Nation's Capitol Religious Liberty and Academic
Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 145(b), 103 Stat. 1284 (1989).
244. Such religious organizations could include groups like a sisterhood or brotherhood.
245. Often hospitals have groups attached to them which help raise funds and/or provide
volunteers to assist the hospital. There should be no religious need to discriminate
based on a suspect classification in such an organization, even if the hospital has a
religious affiliation as do many nonprofit hospitals.
246. The question of the proper reach of employment discrimination laws when the free
exercise of religion arises is even more difficult. While everyone probably would
agree that discrimination in selection of clergy should be beyond the government's
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claims should not succeed when they are being used pretextually to
support discrimination not required for any religious purpose. In each
case, the claims should be carefully analyzed and a balance should be
sought between the competing interests in ending discrimination and in
the free exercise of religion.
III. RECONCILING ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS WITH LIMIT-
ING DISCRIMINATION IN QUASI-PRIVATE CLUBS
This article has addressed two substantial and conflicting interests:
the desire to associate with others who share common interests and the
need to enter society freely and equally without discrimination. These
are both important concerns and must be reconciled.
The Supreme Court's guidelines for intimate association, as enun-
ciated in the Jaycees,247 Rotary,248 and New York State Club Associa-
tion 249 cases, strike a reasonable balance permitting discrimination in
only small, selective, seclusive, and purely social entities. If an organiza-
tion fails any of these tests, states should be allowed to prevent them
from discriminating, despite defenses involving freedom of intimate
association.
Organizations which have truly expressive purposes or political
objectives should be free to discriminate if their discrimination is closely
related to their political agenda. Courts should consider carefully the
relationship between the goals and the discrimination in order to elimi-
nate pretextual discrimination while at the same time ensuring that the
courts are not unduly interfering with the organizations which appear
before them.
Similarly, religious organizations should be permitted to discrimi-
nate in carrying out heir rituals, selecting their members, and employ-
ing people who will carry out their rituals, lead their organizations, or
teach religion. They should also be permitted to provide services to
their members exclusively. When, however, religious organizations serve
or employ nonadherents, they should not be permitted to discriminate.
Moreover, religious individuals should not be allowed to use their
reach, the further one gets from worship and/or leadership of religious bodies, the
harder the issue. For instance, may a religious school discriminate in the hiring of
teachers who do not teach a religion course?
247. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
248. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
249. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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religious beliefs as a basis for discrimination in housing, except when
they are renting an owner occupied building with four or fewer units.
In drafting statutes which bar discrimination, legislators should
take into account the constitutional and associational interests at stake,
as well as the states' interest in barring discrimination. Exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws should be drawn narrowly to exclude only those
groups which are constitutionally protected. The statute should exempt
only "distinctly private clubs" from antidiscrimination laws and should
provide a definition of "distinctly private" which is consistent with the
right to intimate association. Exemptions for religious and expressive
association should also be narrowly drawn.
If courts and legislatures follow the above recommendations, they
will create a reasonable reconciliation between the interests at issue.
This would allow and encourage association in two ways. First, intimate
association will receive protection from state interference. Second,
nonintimate associations will still be permitted to choose their members
and activities. They will only be barred from discriminating against
members of protected classes. Religious groups may continue to exercise
their religion freely, although they may not impose discrimination
where it is not needed. Similarly, political groups could discriminate
when it would be necessary to carry out their political agenda. Howev-
er, groups would have to admit people without discrimination when
barring people would not be necessary to achieving political goals.
People who have suffered from discrimination will be afforded opportu-
nities to participate in activities closed to them in the past, allowing
them entry into all levels of society.250
CONCLUSION
Reaching an appropriate compromise between associational interests and
the need to end discrimination is an important legislative and judicial
endeavor. Courts and government officials should continue efforts to
end discrimination in quasi-private clubs, except in those instances
where major constitutional barriers exist. In all other instances, the
problems caused by discrimination are too vast to remain unaddressed.
Those states which have not yet barred discrimination in public accom-
250. Of course, barring discrimination will not create a panacea. There are many other
ways in which people's full participation in society is limited. Poverty, for example,
creates a major barrier to children who might make great contributions but for lost
educational and other opportunities.
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modations should do so. States which have already barred discrimina-
tion should reexamine their laws to ensure that they have drawn appro-
priate distinctions.
2 51
Courts should broadly and sympathetically interpret these laws in
light of the harm they seek to eliminate. In doing so, courts should
interpret liberally the definition of "public accommodations" and read
narrowly any exceptions in the statutes.
Where legislators are slow to act or courts are unsympathetic to the
statutes, political activity on the issue should continue. Hopefully, some
clubs will stop discriminating as a result of political pressure or pressure
from their members and the community, even if no laws bar their
discrimination. t
251. Some states and the federal government still need to include sex as a protected class
in public accommodations. Most states also need to expand their laws to include
sexual orientation as a protected class.

